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With the passage and implementation of the “first-to-file” provisions of the 
America Invents Act of 2011, the U.S. patent system must rely more than ever 
before on patent documents for its own ontological commitments concerning the 
existence of claimed kinds of useful objects and processes. This Article provides a 
comprehensive description of the previously unrecognized function of the patent 
document in incurring and securing warrants to these ontological commitments, 
and the respective roles of legal doctrines and practices in the patent system’s 
ontological project. Among other contributions, the resulting metaphysical account 
serves to reconcile competing interpretations of the written description requirement 
that have emerged from the Federal Circuit’s recent jurisprudence, and to explain 
why the patent system is willing and able to examine, grant and enforce claims 
reciting theoretical entities. While this Article is entirely descriptive, it concludes 
by identifying promising normative and prescriptive implications of this work, 
including the formulation of an appropriate test for the patent-eligibility of 
software-implemented inventions in the post-Bilski era. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to skeptics at least, self-proclaimed psychics feign familiarity with 
their clients’ personalities and problems by feeding back observed and volunteered 
information as revelation, using a process known as “cold reading.”1 It is easy to 
unmask the technique, if the client is willing to lie to get at the truth. For example, 
a single, unemployed woman may state that “two weeks ago I got a new job at the 
same company where my husband works,” diverting the psychic into an earnest 
discussion of the woman’s nonexistent marital relationship, colleagues, and boss in 
which the psychic simply takes her word for it that these entities exist.2 
In the parlance of metaphysics, this so-called “psychic baiting” ploy roots out 
cold reading3 by exposing weaknesses in the foundations of the psychic’s 
ontology—what the psychic takes to exist in the world.4 The practice of cold 
reading demands that the psychic take on whatever ontological commitments—
commitments to the existence of things5—are expressed by the client in the course 
of their conversation, even when those commitments are not warranted in fact. The 
revelation of such a permissive and incoherent criterion of ontological commitment 
                                                          
 
1 See, e.g., Ray Hyman, Cold Reading: How to Convince Strangers That You Know All About Them, 1 
THE ZETETIC 18 (1976); Clare Wilson, Spellbound: What gives mediums their seemingly uncanny ability 
to read our minds, asks Clare Wilson, NEW SCIENTIST, July 30, 2005, at 32. 
2 See IAN ROWLAND, THE FULL FACTS BOOK OF COLD READING 182–84 (2002) (presenting an example 
of a tarot reading in which the client lies); see also id. at 115–16 (explaining that a cold-reading psychic 
may proceed to discuss or avoid discussion of a dog depending on whether or not the client represents 
that she used to own a dog); Hyman, supra note 1, at 22 (“The [cold] reader, after a suitable interval, 
will usually feed back the information that the client has given him in such a way that the client will be 
further amazed at how much the reader ‘knows’ about him. Invariably the client leaves the reader 
without realizing that everything he has been told is simply what he himself has unwittingly revealed to 
the reader.”). 
3 ROWLAND, supra note 2, at 182 (“In essence, psychic baiting is the only sure way to demonstrate that 
someone giving readings is using cold reading, not genuine psychic ability.”). 
4 See, e.g., WILLIAM BECHTEL, PHILOSOPHY OF MIND: AN OVERVIEW FOR COGNITIVE SCIENCE 2 
(1988) (describing scientific and philosophical approaches to ontology as views on “what we take to 
exist . . . .”). 
5 See, e.g., RINKE HOEKSTRA, ONTOLOGY REPRESENTATION: DESIGN PATTERNS AND ONTOLOGIES 
THAT MAKE SENSE 70 n.1 (2009) (“[A]n ontological commitment is a commitment to the existence of 
something . . . .”). 
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puts the lie to the psychic’s claim of special knowledge regarding the true state of 
the world.6 
The American patent system reposes an extraordinary trust in patent 
applicants that they are not similarly “baiting” the Patent Office, the courts, and the 
public with untenable statements about what they have invented. While the doctrine 
of inequitable conduct aims to deter applicants from making misrepresentations in 
the first place,7 readers of the patent document describing the invention generally 
must take the applicant’s word for it.8 Under the longstanding doctrine of 
constructive reduction to practice,9 there is no requirement that a patent applicant 
actually have made or practiced what she claims to have invented; adequate 
disclosure in a filed patent application suffices.10 Accordingly, the Patent Office 
long ago dispensed with requiring the applicant to produce a working model of the 
invention.11 With the passage and impending implementation of the “first-to-file” 
                                                          
 
6 See ROWLAND, supra note 2, at 8 (describing client testimonials to psychic ability); id. at 184 (noting 
that the psychic-baiting client’s lie does not excuse the psychic’s claim to have seen a nonexistent 
husband). 
7 See Aventis Pharma S.A. v. Amphastar Pharm., 525 F.3d 1334, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., 
dissenting) (“Without doubt, candor and truthful cooperation are essential to an ex parte examination 
system . . . . The threat of inequitable conduct, with its ‘atomic bomb’ remedy of unenforceability, 
ensures that candor and truthfulness.”); but cf. Thomas F. Cotter, An Economic Analysis of Patent Law’s 
Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 735 (2011) (surveying recent debate over whether 
inequitable conduct doctrine actually reduces fraud and suggesting reforms). 
8 The applicant is the author of the patent document because the patent application, authored by the 
applicant, “ripens into” the patent document upon issuance. See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Schein Pharm., 301 
F.3d 1306, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (Rader, J., concurring). 
9 See Warren H. Willner, Origin and Development of the Doctrine of Constructive Reduction to 
Practice, 36 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 618, 619–20, 622–23 (1954) (tracing the doctrine to Wheeler v. Clipper 
Mower, etc., Co., 29 F. Cas. 881 (C.C.N.Y. 1872) and Dolbear v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 126 U.S. 1 (1888)). 
10 See Bigham v. Godtfredsen, 857 F.2d 1415, 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (holding that the constructive 
requirement to practice requires adequate disclosure under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph); J. THOMAS 
MCCARTHY, ROGER E. SCHECHTER & DAVID J. FRANKLYN, MCCARTHY’S DESK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 504 (3d ed. 2004) (“A constructive reduction to practice is the filing of a 
patent application with the [PTO] . . . that adequately discloses the invention.”). 
11 See Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790–1880 (Part II-Conclusion), 65 J. PAT. 
OFF. SOC’Y 234, 271 (1983) (“In 1880 the general model requirement was finally dropped from the 
rules of the Patent Office.”); but see infra text accompanying notes 193–95 (describing rare situations 
where examiners may require a working model). 
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provisions of the America Invents Act of 2011,12 only acts of public disclosure, 
through the filing of a patent application or otherwise—not those of making or 
practicing the invention, will count toward establishing the priority of an inventor’s 
patent claims.13 Now more than ever, the patent system must rely on applicants’ 
representations for its own ontological commitments concerning the existence of 
categories of “useful Arts”;14 i.e., kinds of objects and processes capable of 
producing beneficial effects in the world.15 
Fortunately, the patent system need not practice cold reading in its dealings 
with patent applicants, and its criteria of ontological commitment in reading patent 
documents are much less permissive and more coherent than those of a psychic. As 
this Article will explain, this is because the adequate disclosure requirements of 
§ 112 of the Patent Act serve to regulate the patent document’s role in informing 
the patent system’s ontological commitments. Specifically, the written description 
and enablement requirements enforce the conditions under which the patent system 
incurs ontological commitments to patent claims and takes such commitments to be 
warranted, respectively. More fundamentally, this Article will serve to identify and 
describe the previously unrecognized, but increasingly salient, ontological function 
of the patent document. 
This Article departs methodologically from previous legal scholarship in its 
focused search for, and reliance on, the patent system’s metaphysical 
commitments. Scholars who have previously attributed particular metaphysical 
stances to the patent system have generally done so in order to reject those stances, 
thereby clearing the way for proposed policy or doctrinal reforms.16 A common 
                                                          
 
12 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284 (2011). Section 3 of the Act, 
which contains the “first-to-file” provisions, goes into effect eighteen months from the date of 
enactment, on March 16, 2013. Id. 
13 The America Invents Act does not require strict priority of filing dates, as section § 102(b) excludes 
from prior art certain pre-filing disclosures by or derived from the inventor. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) 
(2012); see also William Ahmann & Tenaya Rodewald, Patent Reform: The Impact on Start-Ups, 24 
INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 3 (Jan. 2012) (describing the new law as creating a “First-(Inventor)-to-
Disclose System”). 
14 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (authorizing Congress “[t]o promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts, by 
securing for limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”). 
15 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 n.7 (1981) (“It is for the discovery or invention of some 
practical method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted. . . .” 
(quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1853))). 
16 See, e.g., Dan L. Burk, Feminism and Dualism in Intellectual Property, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 183, 186 (2007) (arguing that the conception-focused inventorship doctrine exemplifies a 
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characteristic of this literature is that modern philosophy supplies much of the 
artillery against the accused stances but few fortifications in support of the 
proposed changes; thus, potentially powerful metaphysical insights ultimately serve 
only as adjuncts to normative appeals for reform. In contrast, this Article aims to 
demonstrate that an explicit recognition of, and reliance on, the patent system’s 
core metaphysical commitments would be not only jurisprudentially defensible, but 
also instrumental in illuminating the form and nature of the project of “promot[ing] 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts”17 and in aligning patent laws and institutions with 
that constitutional purpose. The advantage of such an approach is that any resulting 
doctrinal proposals can find warrant not only on policy grounds but also 
importantly as metaphysically necessary consequences of settled legal principles. 
Even though the Supreme Court long ago recognized patent law as the “most 
metaphysical branch of modern law,”18 the bench, bar, and academy to date have 
shown remarkably little interest in articulating, stabilizing, and building on the 
essential metaphysical foundations of the patent system.19 Courts in patent cases 
tend instead to attach the term “metaphysical” pejoratively to considerations 
deemed too theoretical to guide practical jurisprudence.20 Practitioners, scholars, 
                                                                                                                                      
 
“striking pattern of dualism” in the patent system that is subject to critique); Ariel Simon, Reinventing 
Discovery: Patent Law’s Characterizations of and Interventions Upon Science, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 
2175, 2192–97 (arguing that modern metaphysics has undermined patent law’s characterization of laws 
of nature as fundamental truths). 
17 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
18 Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 485–86 (1848); see also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 
599 F.2d 685, 706 (5th Cir. 1979) (citing Judge Rich’s comment that “patent law is ‘the metaphysics’ of 
the law”); Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342, 344 (C.C. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) (Story, J.) (“Patents and 
copyrights approach, nearer than any other class of cases belonging to forensic discussions, to what may 
be called the metaphysics of the law, where the distinctions are, or at least may be, very [subtle] and 
refined, and, sometimes, almost evanescent.”); Giles S. Rich, The Relation Between Patent Practices 
and the Anti-Monopoly Laws, 14 FED. CIR. B.J. 87, 92 (2004) (describing patent law as a “metaphysical 
branch of the law” and “the invisible, intangible, incorporeal patent right” as “one of the most elusive of 
all legal concepts . . . .”); cf. Simon, supra note 16, at 2197 (noting that “the metaphysics of patent law” 
is “foundational to doctrines of patentable subject matter” but suggesting that “abstract questions of 
reality otherwise play little to no role in patent law.”). 
19 Cf. Darren Hudson Hick, Making Sense of the Copyrightability of Plots: A Case Study in the Ontology 
of Art, 67 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 399, 399 (2009) (“[W]hile copyright law assumes some 
metaphysical basis to its objects, this basis tends to go largely uninvestigated.”). 
20 See, e.g., In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (en banc) (Linn, J., concurring-in-part 
and dissenting-in-part) (“[T]he outer limits of statutory subject matter should not depend on 
metaphysical distinctions such as those between hardware and software or matter and energy, but rather 
with the requirements of the patent statute. . . .”); Sarkisian v. Winn-Proof Corp., 697 F.2d 1313, 1325 
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and other commentators have generally followed suit: criticizing metaphysical 
approaches to patent doctrine as exceeding the competence of the Patent Office and 
the judiciary,21 clashing with scientific methods and teachings,22 and ignoring 
normative economic considerations.23 
                                                                                                                                      
 
(9th Cir. 1983) (contrasting the courts’ earlier “metaphysical and semantic” approach to double 
patenting with the “specific, workable criteria” used in the current test); Kalamazoo Loose Leaf Binder 
Co. v. Wilson Jones Loose Leaf Co., 286 F. 715, 720 (S.D.N.Y. 1920) (Hand, J.) (dismissing “the 
metaphysical question whether [a binder and rack] form a ‘combination’ or an ‘aggregation.’”); Wilson 
v. Singer, 30 F. Cas. 217, 220 (C.C.D.C. 1860) (rejecting alternative interpretation of joint inventorship 
law as “too refined and metaphysical for the practical business of life.”); see also Earle v. Sawyer, 8 F. 
Cas. 254 (C.C. Mass. 1825) (Story, J.) (“It did not appear to me at the trial, and does not appear to me 
now, that this mode of reasoning upon the metaphysical nature, or the abstract definition of an 
invention, can justly be applied to cases under the patent act. That act proceeds upon the language of 
common sense and common life, and has nothing mysterious or equivocal in it.”); Neil A. Smith, 
Remembrances and Memorial: Judge Giles Sutherland Rich, 1904–1999, 9 FED. CIR. B.J. 87, 92 (1999) 
(noting that one of Judge Rich’s stated intentions in drafting § 103 of the Patent Act was “to release the 
courts from all the metaphysical law of the cases about this concept of ‘invention’ and to make it clear 
that not all inventions, only unobvious inventions, are patentable.”); cf. Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo 
Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 134–35 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (arguing that majority’s 
exclusion of “manifestations of laws of nature” from patentable subject matter relies on “vague and 
malleable terms infected with too much ambiguity and equivocation.”); Rohm & Haas Co., 599 F.2d at 
706 (noting “the difficulty of the subject matter” of 35 U.S.C. § 271, which Judge Rich referred to as 
“the metaphysics of patent law”); Jamesbury Corp. v. U.S., 518 F.2d 1384, 1396 (Ct. Cl. 1975) (quoting 
Mueller Brass Co. v. Reading Indus., 352 F. Supp. 1357, 1372 (E.D. Pa. 1972)) (describing joint 
inventorship as “one of the muddiest concepts in the muddy metaphysics of the patent law.”). 
21 See, e.g., William Michael Schuster, Predictability and Patentable Processes: The Federal Circuit’s 
In re Bilski Decision and Its Effect on the Incentive to Invent, 11 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2009) 
(“[I]nherently difficult metaphysical questions such as ‘What is an abstract idea?’ or ‘What is the 
claimed invention?’ are not the expertise of judges or patent examiners but rather philosophers.”); John 
R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 771, 804 (2003) (noting that State 
Street Bank’s relatively simple test for patent-eligibility held the promise of “decreas[ing] Patent Office 
workload by allowing examiners to avoid the metaphysical inquires that sometimes accompanied” 
previous tests, though increased filings have swamped any such effect); Todd R. Geremia, Protecting 
the Right to Copy: Trade Dress Claims for Configurations in Expired Utility Patents, 92 NW. U. L. REV. 
779, 814–15 (1998) (“[T]o ask courts to make the metaphysical determination of exactly what 
constitutes the ‘true,’ ‘essential,’ or ‘significant’ inventive components of a formerly patented invention 
is to invite chaos and unpredictability.”); Dennis S. Karjala, The Relative Roles of Patent and Copyright 
in the Protection of Computer Programs, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 41, 43 (1998) 
(criticizing “some 20 years of § 101 subject matter metaphysics” during which judges and the Patent 
Office “had great difficulty extricating themselves from the form in which [software] technology 
appeared . . . .”); John A. Kidwell, Software and Semiconductors: Why Are We Confused?, 70 MINN. L. 
REV. 533, 566 (1985) (“The norms of patent law generally create problems in their administration 
because patent law is notorious for asking judges to apply criteria that are almost metaphysical in 
character.”); cf. Douglas A. Applegate, Patenting Improvements: The Costs of Making Patents Easily 
Available, 8 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 429, 442 (1992) (suggesting that the 
Supreme Court’s approach to combination patents in the wake of Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1 
(1966) unhelpfully “wreaked confusion in the patent bar, and rekindled judicial inquiries into the 
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These concerns should of course be taken seriously. It would indeed be 
foolish to expect the Patent Office or the courts to resolve long-contested 
metaphysical questions in the course of administering, enforcing, applying, and 
developing the patent laws. It would be equally unwise for patent law and policy to 
abandon sound science and economics for the sake of mere metaphysical line-
drawing. 
At the same time, the patent system’s metaphysical commitments also need to 
be taken seriously. As Steven Smith persuasively argues in Law’s Quandary,24 
metaphysical commitments “pervade and inform the ways that lawyers talk and 
argue and predict and that judges decide and justify.”25 Legal scholars have long 
recognized the involvement of the metaphysics of causation in accounts of legal 
                                                                                                                                      
 
metaphysics of patentable invention.”). But see Craig Allen Nard, Legal Forms and the Common Law of 
Patents, 90 BOSTON U. L. REV. 51, 57–58 (2010) (citing Jamesbury) (“[M]ore than two centuries of 
experience has taught us that the common law has handled its responsibility relatively well when 
engaging ‘the muddy metaphysics of the patent law.’”); but cf. John R. Thomas, Of Text, Technique, and 
the Tangible: Drafting Patent Claims Around Patent Rules, 17 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUTER & INFO. L. 
219, 266–67 (1998) (arguing that “jurists, PTO officials, and commentators concerned with the patent 
system have not been particularly articulate in describing [the] ontological task” of identifying the 
invention that is the subject of an artfully drafted patent claim, but proposing that the courts and the 
PTO employ “the philosophical discipline of phenomenology.”). 
22 See, e.g., Simon, supra note 16, at 2192 (“[P]atentable-subject-matter jurisprudence is filled with 
metaphysical curiosities that bear little resemblance to how historians of science, philosophers, or even 
scientists think about science.”); Andrew W. Torrance, Metaphysics and Patenting Life, 76 UMKC L. 
REV. 363, 395 (2007) (criticizing the Canadian Supreme Court’s appeal to “[m]etaphysical phenomena, 
such as souls and spirits,” in delineating the patentability of life forms, as being “outside the analytical 
reach of the scientific method . . . .”); cf. DAVID R. KOEPSELL, THE ONTOLOGY OF CYBERSPACE: LAW, 
PHILOSOPHY AND THE FUTURE OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 102–04, 111 & 121–24 (2000) (arguing 
that the current “legal ontology” of information technology draws distinctions among media of 
expression that computer science shows to be false, and advocating legal reform based on “correct 
ontologies,” including the abolition of software patents). 
23 See, e.g., Kevin Emerson Collins, The Reach of Literal Claim Scope into After-Arising Technology: 
On Thing Construction and the Meaning of Meaning, 41 CONN. L. REV. 493, 554–57 (2008) (arguing 
that metaphysical approaches to after-arising technologies will lead courts “to dole out identical 
treatment for pairings of patentees and alleged infringers who are distinct from a normative 
perspective.”); A. Samuel Oddi, Contributory Infringement/Patent Misuse: Metaphysics and 
Metamorphosis, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 73, 127–30 (1982) (arguing that the Supreme Court’s metaphysical 
approach in Dawson Chem. Co. v. Rohm & Haas Co., 448 U.S. 176 (1980), led to a result that creates 
uneven incentives for inventive activity). 
24 STEVEN DOUGLAS SMITH, LAW’S QUANDARY (2004). 
25 Steven D. Smith, Metaphysical Perplexity?, 55 CATH. U. L. REV. 639, 644–45 (2006) (summarizing a 
central thesis of LAW’S QUANDARY for a symposium on the book). 
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responsibility, particularly in the areas of criminal and tort law.26 In the patent 
system, inventors, examiners, lawyers, and judges are tasked with drafting and 
reviewing statements about the capacities of objects and processes to cause 
beneficial effects in the world.27 Patent claims, the patent system’s stock in trade,28 
are essentially ad hoc ontological categories29—the metaphysician’s stock in 
trade.30 It is not hard to imagine that ontological commitments might attach to legal 
                                                          
 
26 See, e.g., MICHAEL S. MOORE, CAUSATION & RESPONSIBILITY (2009); H.L.A. HART & TONY 
HONORÉ, CAUSATION IN THE LAW (2d ed. 1985); Marcelo Ferrante, Causation in Criminal 
Responsibility, 11 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 470 (2008); Michael Moore, For What Must We Pay? Causation 
and Counterfactual Baselines, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1181 (2003); Michael S. Moore, The Metaphysics 
of Causal Intervention, 88 CAL. L. REV. 827 (2000); Stephen J. Morse, The Moral Metaphysics of 
Causation and Results, 88 CAL. L. REV. 879 (2000); Jane Stapleton, Choosing What We Mean by 
“Causation” in the Law, 73 MO. L. REV. 433 (2008); Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 
CAL. L. REV. 1735 (1985). 
27 See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, 
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent 
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 
n.7 (1981) (“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing a 
beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted. . . .” (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 
(1853))). 
28 See, e.g., Giles S. Rich, Extent of Protection and Interpretation of Claims: American Perspectives, 21 
INT’L REV. INDUS. PROP. & COPYRIGHT L. 497, 499 (1990) (“To coin a phrase, the name of the game is 
the claim.”). 
29 See Jeffrey A. Lefstin, The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of Enablement, 23 
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1141, 1168 (2008) (noting “the ontological nature of patent claims . . . .”). 
30 See Jan Westerhoff, The Construction of Ontological Categories, 82 AUSTRALASIAN J. PHIL. 595, 595 
(2004) (“[T]he notion of an ontological category . . . is central to ontology and metaphysics (it is, after 
all, what these disciplines are about).”). It should be noted that Westerhoff’s highly abstract notion of an 
ontological category excludes “categories as specific as kni[v]es and forks, tables and chairs, or chairs 
and palaces,” and presumably would also exclude typical patent claims. Id. at 596. Neither do patent 
claims appear to provide a general ontological account of the relation between artifacts as “higher-order 
objects and their material basis.” Wybo Houkes & Anthonie Meijers, The Ontology of Artefacts: The 
Hard Problem, 37 STUD. HIST. PHIL. SCI. 118, 119 (2006) (concluding that describing such a relation is 
“a hard problem in metaphysics”). Patent claim drafting’s ad hoc approach is more closely related to the 
recent use of ontological categories in information science and biomedicine to organize domain-specific 
knowledge. See Katherine Munn, What is Ontology For?, in APPLIED ONTOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 7, 
10–12 (Katherine Munn & Barry Smith eds., 2009) (discussing the need for an information system to 
“have a categorical structure readymade for slotting each piece of information programmed into it under 
the appropriate heading” and to organize domain-specific human knowledge about reality); THE OPEN 
BIOLOGICAL AND BIOMEDICAL ONTOLOGIES, http://www.obofoundry.org (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) 
(providing open-source ontologies for further research and development in various fields of biology and 
biomedical research). 
While longstanding patent doctrine entitles inventor-applicants to devise their own ontologies 
within the scope of the prosecution history, see, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 
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accounts of patent acquisition, validity, and infringement, even if only tacitly, 
giving rise to a rich ontology of “useful Arts.” Part II of this Article develops the 
first descriptive account of such an ontology, deriving formal characterizations of 
the ontological status of claims and their embodiments from linguistics and the 
philosophy of science. 
Given the long-settled principle of patent claim interpretation that claims are 
to be read in light of the specification,31 it is not surprising that the specification 
informs the patent system’s ontology. Parts III and IV address the role of the 
specification in incurring and warranting ontological commitments to claims and 
their embodiments. Part III offers an interpretation of the written description 
requirement as a doctrine of ontological possession. This interpretation reconciles 
the Federal Circuit’s affirmation in its recent Ariad en banc opinion32 that adequate 
written description requires the applicant to demonstrate “possession of the 
invention”33 with Jeffrey Lefstin’s equally defensible reading of the requirement as 
a demand for adequate “definitional information” concerning the scope of patent 
claims.34 Part IV exhibits the enablement requirement’s role in ensuring that the 
patent system’s ontological commitments are warranted. The legal literature has 
not previously explained the fact that the patent system routinely is willing and able 
to examine, grant, and enforce claims that recite unobserved theoretical entities, 
therefore effectively taking the word of scientists that subatomic particles and the 
like exist.35 Using the Federal Circuit’s decision in Centricut v. Esab Group36 as a 
                                                                                                                                      
 
F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“[W]e have held many times that a patentee can act as his own 
lexicographer to specifically define terms of a claim contrary to their ordinary meaning”), at least one 
information science researcher questions the necessity of this ad hoc approach. Jeffrey Gower, a 
graduate student at University at Buffalo-SUNY, has embarked on a massive computer-driven effort to 
unify the ontology of patent claims around “a structured and controlled vocabulary.” Towards an 
Ontology of Patent Claims, 3TU CENTER FOR ETHICS AND TECHNOLOGY, http://www.ethicsand 
technology.eu/news/comments/towards_an_ontology_of_patent_claims/ (last visited Mar. 23, 2013) 
(abstract for Gower’s Apr. 29, 2010 presentation). 
31 See, e.g., Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting In re Fout, 
675 F.2d 297, 300 (C.C.P.A. 1982)); Nash Engineering Co. v. Cashin, 13 F.2d 718, 721 (1st Cir. 1926). 
32 Ariad Pharm. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
33 See id. at 1351. 
34 Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1217. 
35 The search query “clm(electron) & da(2011)” to Westlaw’s US-PAT database finds 2,726 patents 
issued in 2011 containing the word “electron” in at least one claim. 
36 Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
T H E  O N T O L O G I C A L  F U N C T I O N   
 
P A G E  |  2 7 3   
 
 
ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2012.194 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
case study, Part IV explains how the patent system’s epistemological commitment 
to scientific realism informs the court’s analysis of claims involving the causal 
powers of electrons. 
If this account of the ontological function of the patent document is 
reasonably accurate, it will illuminate not only the form and nature of the patent 
system’s project of “promoting . . . Progress,” but the coherence of proposed 
reforms within that project.37 Thus, even though this Article is descriptive, it has 
extensive normative and prescriptive implications that warrant further 
investigation. Part V summarizes this Article’s descriptive analysis and previews 
its prescriptive sequel. Responding to the Federal Circuit’s split decision in In re 
Nuijten,38 Part V explains how an “essential causation requirement” that reflects the 
patent system’s metaphysical commitments might put patentable subject matter 
doctrine on firm footing.39 Part V defers a fuller discussion of recommended 
reforms to a future article. 
II. THE PATENT SYSTEM’S ONTOLOGY OF “USEFUL ARTS” 
A. The Ontological Status of Claims 
1. Claims as Kinds 
In the modern patent system, patent claims “stand alone to define the 
invention.”40 Any study of the patent system’s ontological commitments must 
therefore begin with a precise metaphysical and linguistic characterization of the 
valid41 patent claims that are the subject of those commitments. 
A widespread misconception about patent claims is that they are merely sets 
of embodiments, so that certain doctrines about claim scope are reducible to set-
theoretic propositions.42 This is a useful intuition for introducing the notion of 
                                                          
 
37 U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8. 
38 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
39 See Andrew Chin, Patentable Causation (working title, forthcoming). 
40 Ex parte Fressola, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1608, 1609 (B.P.A.I. 1993). 
41 It is implicit throughout Part III.A that any discussion of the linguistic structure of claims is referring 
to valid claims. It is, of course, possible to file a linguistically nonsensical or deviant claim, but such a 
claim would not be held valid. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) (2006 & Supp. V 2011) (“The specification shall 
conclude with one or more claims pointing out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the 
inventor or a joint inventor regards as the invention.”). 
42 See, e.g., Thomas D. Brainard, Patent Claim Construction: A Graphic Look, 82 J. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 670 passim (2000) (using Venn diagrams to illustrate “[t]he patent concepts of 
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claim scope and the distinction between claims and embodiments. However, it is an 
imprecise and inadequate ontological description because while the definition of a 
set necessarily determines a patent claim’s elements,43 the language of a claim does 
not determine which, if any, of its embodiments exist. Conversely, the number of 
existing patent claim embodiments has no effect on the claim’s scope.44 All empty 
sets are identical,45 yet there are many distinct patent claims with no existing 
embodiments.46 
For purposes of metaphysical and linguistic ontology, it is more accurate to 
describe patent claims and their embodiments in terms of the distinction between 
“types” and “tokens.” In metaphysics, the type-token distinction conceptually 
separates a category—an abstract type—from its members—a concrete token, 
                                                                                                                                      
 
validity, infringement, prior art, the doctrine of equivalents, file history estoppel and principles of claim 
differentiation.”); Raj S. Davé, A Mathematical Approach to Claim Elements and the Doctrine of 
Equivalents, 16 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 507, 518–25 (2003) (using Venn diagrams to illustrate doctrine of 
equivalents and prosecution history estoppel); Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming Intellectual Property, 76 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 719, 772 (2009) (“[O]ne point of consensus . . . is . . . to ensure that patent claims should 
enable a properly sized set of embodiments—not too big, not too small—to be protected.”); Charles L. 
Gholz, A Critique of Recent Opinions in Patent Interferences, 86 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 
464, 476–83 (2004) (using Venn diagram to illustrate blocking situation resulting from interference 
decision); Michael J. Meurer & Craig Allen Nard, Invention, Refinement and Patent Claim Scope: A 
New Perspective on the Doctrine of Equivalents, 93 GEO. L.J. 1947, 1984 (2005) (describing the 
“refinement” of patent claims during prosecution as the “process of identifying and claiming the 
broadest patentable set of embodiments enabled by the disclosure in the patent specification.”); Samson 
Vermont, A New Way to Determine Obviousness: Applying the Pioneer Doctrine to 35 U.S.C. § 103(a), 
29 AIPLA Q.J. 375, 418–24 (2001) (describing anticipation and obviousness in terms of Venn 
diagrams). But cf. Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1159–67 (finding that “[n]early all of the doctrines of patent 
law . . . may be posed almost as mathematical set-functions whose truth value is described in terms of 
the claimed subject matter,” but concluding that “patent law [is] not reducible to a simple set-theoretic 
system” insofar as it is impossible “to formulate a doctrine of enablement as a simple function of 
exclusion or inclusion.”). 
43 See Nicholas Wolterstorff, Toward an Ontology of Art Works, 9 NOUS 115, 121 (1975) (noting that 
“whatever members a set has it has necessarily.”). It should be noted that the truth of this statement 
assumes the axiom of extensionality, which is widely accepted in set theory. See, e.g., AZRIEL LÉVY, 
BASIC SET THEORY 5 (1979) (stating the axiom as “if [sets] y and z have the same members they are 
equal.”). 
44 See Collins, supra note 23, at 503 (noting that the exclusionary scope of a widget patent claim “is 
unaffected by a patentee’s decision to manufacture ten or ten thousand widgets.”). 
45 See Wolterstorff, supra note 43 (“That there is but one null set is clear enough.”). 
46 To be valid, a patent claim need not be actually reduced to practice. See supra text accompanying note 
10. 
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which exemplifies the type.47 In linguistics, the term “kind” is often used 
synonymously with “type”;48 thus, a noun phrase may refer to a kind rather than a 
particular object, as in “The Irish economy became dependent upon the potato.”49 
In both of these contexts, a patent claim is accurately understood as a “type” or 
“kind” whose embodiments are its “tokens” or “examples.”50 
The metaphysics literature provides strong support for the view that patent 
claims are kinds of embodiments. In an influential51 1975 article, philosopher 
Nicholas Wolterstorff set out to determine the ontological status of various creative 
works.52 He took pains to distinguish between works and their examples, in much 
the same way that the 1976 Copyright Act dissected the bundle of uses of an 
underlying copyrighted work.53 Despite the clear relevance of Wolsterstorff’s work 
for copyright law, he did not mention copyright, and his analysis does not appear to 
have engaged the attention of legal scholars.54 Wolterstorff squarely rejected “the 
view that performance-works and object-works are sets of their examples,”55 
reasoning that the existence of a creative work is independent of the existence of 
performances and artifacts, which exemplify that work: 
                                                          
 
47 See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY 936–37 (Robert Audi ed., 1999) (defining “type-
token distinction”). 
48 See, e.g., WAYNE A. DAVIS, MEANING EXPRESSION, AND THOUGHT 316 (2003) (“I can see no 
metaphysical reason not to use ‘type’ and ‘kind’ interchangeably, and thus to describe words and 
thoughts as kinds of things.”). 
49 Manfred Krifka et al., Genericity: An Introduction, in THE GENERIC BOOK 1, 2 (Gregory N. Carlson 
& Francis Jeffry Pelletier eds., 1995) (noting that “the potato” in this sentence does not refer to “some 
particular potato or group of potatoes, but rather the kind Potato (Solanum tuberosum) itself.”). 
50 See Collins, supra note 23, at 503 (“Except in the calculation of damages, references to ‘things’ or 
‘sets of things’ in patent law invoke types, not tokens.”); cf. Sean B. Seymore, The Teaching Function of 
Patents, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 621, 626 n.23 (2010) (“An ‘embodiment’ is a concrete form of an 
invention (like a chemical compound or a widget) described in a patent application or patent.”). 
51 See Charles Nussbaum, Kinds, Types, and Musical Ontology, 61 J. AESTHETICS & ART CRITICISM 
273, 273 (2003) (describing Wolterstorff’s article as “influential”). 
52 See Wolterstorff, supra note 43, at 115 (“What sort of entity is a symphony? A drama? A dance? A 
graphic art print? A sculpture? A poem? A film? A painting? Are works of art all fundamentally alike in 
their ontological status?”). 
53 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2006). 
54 No citation to Wolterstoff’s article appears in Westlaw’s TP-ALL database. Subsequent philosophers, 
however, have recently begun to examine the ontological status of objects of copyright law. See, e.g., 
Hick, supra note 19. 
55 Wolterstorff, supra note 43, at 121. 
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Just as an art work might have had different and more or fewer performances 
and objects than it does have, so too the kind Man, for example, might have had 
different and more or fewer examples than it does have. If Napoleon had not 
existed, it would not then have been the case that Man did not exist. Rather, Man 
would then have lacked one of the examples which in fact it had. And secondly, 
just as there may be two distinct unperformed symphonies, so too may there be 
two distinct unexampled kinds—e.g., the Unicorn and the Hippogriff.56 
Wolterstorff wrote that these observations “tend[] at once to confirm us in the 
suggestion that art works are kinds whose examples are the examples of those 
works.”57 More specifically, “[a] performance-work is a certain kind of 
performance; an object-work is a certain kind of object.”58 
Wolterstorff’s analysis of creative works applies with equal force to patent 
claims. Like a symphony composition that exists and is the subject of copyright 
regardless of how often it has been performed, a patent claim exists and defines the 
same scope of patent rights regardless of which, if any, embodiments of the claim 
exist. Patent claims also exist as unexampled kinds because an inventor may obtain 
a patent without actually reducing the invention to practice. Under the doctrine of 
constructive reduction to practice, the filing of a patent application that satisfies the 
written description, enablement, and best mode requirements of § 11259 has the 
same legal effect as conception and actual reduction to practice through the 
creation of an operative embodiment.60 These observations support the conclusion 
that a patent claim is a kind whose examples are its embodiments.61 
                                                          
 
56 Id. at 126–27. 
57 Id. at 126. 
58 Id. 
59 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006 & Supp. V 2011). 
60 Compare Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The filing of a patent application 
serves as conception and constructive reduction to practice of the subject matter described in the 
application.”), and Yasuko Kawai v. Metlesics, 480 F.2d 880, 885 (C.C.P.A. 1973) (“[T]he act of filing 
the United States application has the legal effect of being, constructively at least, a simultaneous 
conception and reduction to practice of the invention.”), with Slip Track Systems, Inc. v. Metal-Lite, 
Inc., 304 F.3d 1256, 1265 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“In order to establish actual reduction to practice, the 
inventor must prove that he constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the 
limitations of the claim, and that he determined that the invention would work for its intended 
purpose.”). 
61 In contrast with copyrighted works and patent claims, the subject matter protected by trademark law 
appears to defy ontological classification. See Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 
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A close linguistic analysis of patent claim language also leads to the 
conclusion that patent claims are kinds of embodiments. Interestingly, linguists 
have singled out the verb “invent” as a stock example of a kind-level predicate—an 
expression that can be true of a kind but not of individual members or of quantified 
sets of members of the kind.62 As a group of leading scholars in the field explains: 
There are some predicates with argument places that can be filled only with 
kind-referring NPs [noun phrases]. Examples are the subject argument of die out 
or be extinct and the object argument of invent or exterminate. The reason is, of 
course, that only kinds (not objects) can die out or be invented.63 
Linguists therefore justifiably regard a kind-level predicate as strongly indicative of 
an accompanying reference to a kind.64 
As with Wolterstorff’s dissection of creative works, this linguistic analysis 
neither references nor is referenced by the legal literature.65 Yet the ongoing 
examination of “invent” as a linguistic predicate offers a significant insight into the 
grammar of patent claims. 
                                                                                                                                      
 
159, 164 (1995) (“It is the source-distinguishing ability of a mark—not its ontological status as color, 
shape, fragrance, word, or sign—that permits it to serve these basic purposes.”). 
62 See GREGORY N. CARLSON, REFERENCES TO KINDS IN ENGLISH 47 (1980) (identifying a class of 
predicates “which cannot meaningfully be said of any particular individuals, nor can they meaningfully 
be said of any of the quantified NP’s of the language” and referring to them as “special predicates”); see 
also Predicate (grammar), WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Predicate_(grammar)#Kind-level_ 
predicates (last visited Mar. 11, 2013) (defining a kind-level predicate as a predicate that “is true of a 
kind of thing, but cannot be applied to individual members of the kind”). The characterization of kind-
level predicates is credited to Carlson. See, e.g., THEODORE B. FERNALD, PREDICATES AND TEMPORAL 
ARGUMENTS 37 (2000) (describing kind-level predicates as a “type-theoretic distinction” drawn by 
Carlson). 
63 Krifka, supra note 49, at 10. See Berit Brogaard, Sharvy’s Theory of Definite Descriptions Revisited, 
88 PAC. PHIL. Q. 160, 177 n.12 (2007) (“‘Babbage invented the computer,’ for example, does not seem 
to be making a claim about the sum of the world’s computers. Rather, it seems to be making a claim 
about the concept computer.”); Friederike Moltmann, Properties and Kinds of Tropes: New Linguistic 
Facts and Old Philosophical Insights, 113 MIND 1, 33 n.23 (2004) (citing examples of “kind-specific 
predicates”); Roberto Zamparelli, Definite and Bare Kind-Denoting Noun Phrases, in ROMANTIC 
LANGUAGES AND LINGUISTIC THEORY 2000, at 305, 311–12 (Claire Beyssade et al. eds., 2002) 
(providing “invented” as an example of a kind-level predicate operating on “Edison” and “light-bulbs”). 
64 See Zamparelli, supra note 63, at 309 (“Probably the best case for the linguistic relevance of kinds 
comes from predicates which cannot usually apply to ordinary individuals . . . .”). 
65 The terms “kind-level predicate,” “kind-specific predicate” and “kind predicate” do not appear in 
Westlaw’s TP-ALL database. 
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Indefinite singular noun phrases—singular nouns preceded by the indefinite 
article “a” or “an”—have been regarded as incompatible with kind-level 
predicates.66 For example, it is valid to say “Bell invented the telephone” or 
“Honeybees are dying out” but unacceptable to say “A lion will become extinct 
soon.”67 Bart Geurts and Veneeta Dayal have pointed out, however, that an 
indefinite singular noun phrase is acceptable “provided it names a novel kind.”68 
For example, the sentence, “This morning Fred invented a pumpkin-crusher,” is a 
valid sentence in which the noun phrase “a pumpkin-crusher” denotes a novel 
kind.69 As Olav Mueller-Reichau explains, 
Dayal’s point of departure was the widespread assumption that the use of an 
indefinite article is connected to a certain pragmatic novelty condition. This 
condition brings it about that any individual designated by an indefinite noun 
phrase must be understood as being newly introduced into the discourse. What is 
(more or less) common wisdom as far as interpretations at the object-level are 
concerned, is supposed to be true also at the kind-level: indefinite NPs are used 
to introduce kinds when they have the status of novel discourse referents.70 
Read as a whole, the grammar of a patent claim is consistent with that of one 
or more novel kinds serving as object arguments for the predicate “invented.” 
While boilerplate such as “I claim”; “We claim”; “The invention claimed is”; or 
“What is claimed is”; is more common,71 implicit in the language preceding every 
set of patent claims is the assertion that the applicant invented the subject matter of 
the claims.72 Thus, for example, in the following claim, “8. A golf ball having a 
cover and a core wherein the cover comprises a thermoset cationic polyurethane 
                                                          
 
66 See Krifka, supra note 49, at 10. 
67 Id. 
68 Veneeta Dayal, Number Marking and (In)Definiteness in Kind Terms, 27 LINGUISTICS & PHIL. 393, 
396 (2004) (citing Bart Geurts, Genericity, Anaphora and Scope, Paper presented at the Workshop on 
Genericity at University of Cologne (2001)). 
69 Id. 
70 See OLAV MUELLER-REICHAU, SORTING THE WORLD: ON THE RELEVANCE OF THE TYPE/TOKEN-
DISTINCTION TO REFERENTIAL SEMANTICS 66 (2011) (citation omitted). 
71 See FABER ON MECHANICS OF PATENT CLAIM DRAFTING § 2:2, at 2-2 (6th ed. 2009) (citing M.P.E.P. 
§ 608.01(m)). 
72 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(f) (providing that “[a] person shall be entitled to a patent unless . . . he did not 
himself invent the subject matter sought to be patented.”). 
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ionomer,”73 “a golf ball,” “a cover,” “a core,” and “a thermoset cationic 
polyurethane ionomer” are all indefinite singular noun phrases. The sentence that 
begins with “We invented” and concludes with the text of claim 8 is a valid 
sentence in which “invented” is a kind-level predicate and each indefinite noun 
phrase introduces a novel kind into the discourse of the claim. 
More generally, the prohibition on “inferential claiming,”74 a technical rule of 
claim drafting, strictly regulates the use of definite and indefinite articles preceding 
claim elements. Patent attorneys are instructed: 
It is important that a new item mentioned for the first time in the claim not 
be first mentioned as an element operated upon or cooperated with by a previous 
element described in the same clause . . . . 
A new element or step is introduced with an indefinite article “a” or “an.” 
(Some plural items have no introductory article “a” and are introduced by the 
plural noun itself. But, from the context, the silent introductory indefinite article 
can be inferred.) On the other hand, when a previously identified element or step 
is repeated, it is introduced by a definite article “the” or “said.”75 
In linguistic terms, each indefinite noun phrase in the body of the claim 
introduces a novel kind—a new element or step—into the discourse of the claims. 
As for the preamble of the claim, each indefinite noun phrase appearing therein 
introduces the claim as a whole, which itself refers to a novel kind, provided that 
the claim is valid.76 In the product claim example above, each of the indefinite 
singular noun phrases represents a novel kind. In process claims, steps typically 
take the form of gerunds,77 which have the external characteristics of a noun 
phrase78 and therefore also represent novel kinds when they lack antecedent basis. 
Claim drafting thus conforms to the linguistic practice of using indefinite noun 
phrases “to introduce kinds when they have the status of novel discourse 
                                                          
 
73 U.S. Patent No. 5,692,974 col.8 ll.34–35 (issued Dec. 2, 1997). 
74 See FABER, supra note 71, § 10:7.4, at 10-43. 
75 Id. 
76 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a), (e), (f) & (g) (requiring the applicant to be the first inventor of the claimed 
invention). 
77 See, e.g., Lock See Yu-Jahnes, An Introduction to Claim Drafting, 906 PLI/Pat 143, 151 (2007). 
78 See Richard Hudson, Gerunds Without Phrase Structure, 21 NAT. LANGUAGE & LINGUISTIC THEORY 
579, 579 (2003). 
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referents”;79 i.e., when there is no antecedent basis in the claims that serves as a 
referent for the newly mentioned element or step. Simply put: claims are written as 
novel kinds are written. 
As we have seen, recent scholarship in metaphysical and linguistic ontology 
provides strong analytical support for the characterization of patent claims as kinds, 
rather than sets, of embodiments. This may have been a distinction without a 
difference in the previous patent literature,80 but the significance of patent claims’ 
kindhood is immediately evident when we undertake to examine the nature of the 
patent system’s ontological commitments.81 
2. Claim Language and Essential Sortals 
Claims are kinds, but they are not natural kinds: their boundaries are fixed a 
posteriori by patent attorneys, not a priori by nature.82 At least according to 
Aristotelian metaphysics, only natural kinds can be said to have essential 
properties;83 i.e., properties that it is metaphysically necessary for a thing of the 
kind to have.84 Evidently, however, the patent system’s worldview is not Aristotle’s 
worldview because a claim is a kind of kind that has essential properties.85 
Specifically, the language of a claim facilitates picking out individuals of the 
claimed kind and identifying properties of those individuals that are essential to 
their kind.86 
                                                          
 
79 MULLER-REICHAU, supra note 70. 
80 The search term “kind of embodiment” does not appear in Westlaw’s TP-ALL database. 
81 See infra Part III.C. 
82 See BRIAN ELLIS, SCIENTIFIC ESSENTIALISM 19 (2001) (“[M]embership of a natural kind is decided 
by nature, not by us. . . . [T]he identity of a natural kind can never be dependent only on our interests, 
psychologies, perceptual apparatus, languages, practices, or choices. For if the identity of a kind 
depended on any of these things, then it might well be a kind of our own making, not one that exists in 
the world prior to our knowledge, perception, or description of it.”). 
83 See Collins, supra note 23, at 525–26 (citing Michael R. Ayers, Locke Versus Aristotle on Natural 
Kinds, 78 J. PHIL. 247, 250–53 (1981) (discussing natural kinds)). 
84 See Teresa Robertson, Essential vs. Accidental Properties, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 29, 2008), http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/essential-accidental (characterizing 
essential properties modally in terms of metaphysical necessity and possibility). 
85 Cf. Collins, supra note 23, at 526 (suggesting that courts are influenced by “a different and more 
modern type of essentialism” that is “scientific, physical and structural.”). 
86 This essentialist approach to kinds is most commonly associated with the causal account of reference 
developed by linguistic philosophers Saul Kripke and Hilary Putnam. See SAUL KRIPKE, NAMING AND 
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In metaphysical terms, the language of each claim corresponds to an essential 
sortal. While the definition of a sortal varies,87 a sortal is commonly understood to 
provide a criterion of identity for items of a kind.88 Examples of terms that would 
widely be recognized as sortals include “person,” “man,” “brick,” “tomato,” 
“flamingo,”89 “cat,” “dog,” “mountain,” “star,” and “table.”90 In contrast, 
philosopher E.J. Lowe explains, “red thing” is not considered a sortal because 
whether or not one red thing is identical with another does not depend on a single 
condition applicable to all red things but “depends at least in part on what sort or 
kind of red things they are—and then the relevant criterion of identity will be that 
supplied by the relevant sortal term, be it say, ‘cat,’ ‘apple,’ or ‘star.’”91 As 
philosopher Penelope Mackie explains more generally: 
                                                                                                                                      
 
NECESSITY (1980); Hilary Putnam, The Meaning of Meaning, in 2 MIND, LANGUAGE AND REALITY: 
PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 215 (1975). An anti-essentialist, descriptivist theory of reference also has a 
distinguished pedigree. See, e.g., Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 MIND 479 (1905). 
In a fascinating forthcoming article, Daniel Nazer finds both theories implicitly at play in patent 
doctrine. See Daniel Nazer, Solving Rader’s Paradox: Patent Law’s Quest for a Theory of Reference 
(Feb. 6, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://www.law.uh.edu/wipip2012/Abstracts/ 
NazerPaper_WIPIP2012.pdf. While Nazer finds that descriptivism tends to be dominant, he declines to 
find either theory to be the sole “correct” one, and argues for the necessity of keeping the essentialist 
approach available to inform patent doctrine (e.g., in applying the written description requirement to 
biotechnology patent claims when reference-fixing descriptions are impracticable). See id. 
Nazer’s analysis highlights the point that while claim language facilitates identifying the 
properties of individuals (i.e., embodiments) that are essential to their kind, the practice of reading a 
claim on an alleged embodiment, see infra text accompanying notes 95–97, does not necessarily follow 
such an approach, nor should it necessarily do so. I do not argue here to the contrary. My more modest 
contention is that the language of a claim always makes an essentialist approach possible, whether or not 
the applicable doctrine leads the patent system to take it. 
87 See Richard E. Grandy, Sortals, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Apr. 17, 2007), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/sortals (surveying characterizations of sortals). 
88 See id.; E.J. Lowe, Individuation, in A COMPANION TO METAPHYSICS 28 (Jaegwon Kim et al. eds., 
2009) (“It is commonly said that the key distinction between sortal and adjectival terms is that while 
both possess criteria of application, only the former possess criteria of identity.”) (citation omitted); 
Penelope Mackie, Sortal Concepts and Essential Properties, 44 PHIL. Q. 311, 312–13 (1994) 
(“Although [the notion of a sortal] has been employed in slightly different ways, a common thread is 
provided by the idea that sortal concepts have a special role in individuation: they are concepts that 
provide criteria of identity or principles of individuation for the things that fall under them . . . .”). 
89 See Mackie, supra note 88, at 311–13. 
90 See Lowe, supra note 88, at 30. 
91 See id. at 28. 
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[I]f ‘C’ is not a sortal term, then the attempt to single something out as ‘this C,’ 
‘that C,’ etc., will fail to determine what counts as the same individual as the one 
picked out, unless some sortal term is implicitly being invoked, in which case it 
is the sortal term, and not ‘C,’ that is really doing the work.92 
Mackie defines essential sortals as follows: “A sortal concept S is an essential 
sortal if and only if the things that fall under S could not have existed without 
falling under S.”93 
Using terms to individuate things of an artificial kind is not necessarily 
straightforward. The term “clock” does not help to explain when a particular clock 
loses its original identity in the course of having all of its parts successively 
repaired and replaced.94 The patent system, however, does not concern itself with 
the persistence of the identity of embodiments over time. In each of the contexts in 
which it is necessary for the patent system to identify individual products or 
processes to which claim terms apply, i.e., to determine whether a claim literally 
“reads on” a given product or process, there is a single temporal focus. In the 
interference context, the relevant time for the “reads on” inquiry is when a party 
purports to have actually reduced the claimed invention to practice.95 In an 
anticipation analysis, it is the effective date of the prior art reference that allegedly 
anticipates the claim.96 And in a proceeding against literal infringement, it is the 
date of the challenged conduct involving the accused device.97 In each of these 
                                                          
 
92 See Mackie, supra note 88, at 313. 
93 See id. 
94 See DAVID WIGGINS, SAMENESS AND SUBSTANCE RENEWED 92 (2001) (“Nor is there one piece of 
clock—the spring, the regulator, the escapement, the face, the case . . . which the concept clock could 
suggest that we should revere as the ‘focus’ or ‘nucleus’ of a clock, and which can help us past this 
difficulty.”). 
95 See, e.g., Eaton v. Evans, 204 F.3d 1094, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“In an interference proceeding, a 
party seeking to establish an actual reduction to practice must [have] . . . constructed an embodiment or 
performed a process that met every element of the interference count . . . .”). 
96 See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1322–23 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“[T]he 
proper framework for challenging the validity of a patent is . . . to show that every element of the patent 
claims reads on a single prior art reference.”). 
97 See, e.g., Jeneric/Pentron, Inc. v. Dillon Co., 205 F.3d 1377, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“[A]n accused 
product literally infringes if every limitation recited in the claim appears in the accused product, i.e., the 
properly construed claim reads on the accused product exactly.”); Mark A. Lemley, The Changing 
Meaning of Patent Claim Terms, 104 MICH. L. REV. 101, 108 (2005) (“Whether an accused device 
infringes is tested as of the time of the alleged infringement . . . .”). 
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contexts, the patent system’s inquiry into the identity of an embodiment is confined 
to the properties the embodiment possesses at the relevant time, regardless of any 
prior or subsequent changes. 
The boundless ability of humans to define and name parts of things can also 
complicate the use of sortals to count items of a kind. Consider an ancient puzzle 
posed by the Stoic philosopher Chrysippus: 
Dion, a whole-bodied man, has a proper part, Theon, which consists of all of 
Dion except Dion’s left foot. This morning Dion’s left foot was amputated. If 
Dion and Theon both survive there are two material objects coincident in space 
and time, and made of the same matter! Which has ceased to exist? Not Dion—a 
man can survive the loss of a foot. Not Theon, which has had no part chopped 
off.98 
The apparent conclusion that such coincident material objects survive as 
numerically distinct entities is unacceptable to many philosophers.99 To avoid this 
result, Michael Burke offers the following premises as an “essentialist solution” to 
Chrysippus’s puzzle: (1) “the concept of a person is maximal, that is, that proper 
parts of persons are not themselves persons”; (2) “persons are essentially persons 
and thus . . . nonpersons are essentially nonpersons”; (3) the separation from Theon 
of Dion’s left foot was a change that would have made Theon a person if Theon 
survived.100 According to these premises, Theon was essentially a nonperson, i.e., a 
proper part of Dion, and therefore could not have survived the separation from 
Dion’s foot that would have changed him into a person.101 
Burke’s argument is debatable as a solution to Chrysippus’s puzzle,102 but it 
does provide a coherent account103 that fits the patent system’s treatment of a 
                                                          
 
98 Jim Stone, Why Sortal Essentialism Cannot Solve Chrysippus’s Puzzle, 62 ANALYSIS 216, 216 
(2002). 
99 See id. 
100 See Michael Burke, Dion and Theon: An Essentialist Solution to an Ancient Puzzle, 90 J. PHIL. 129, 
134 (1994). 
101 See id. at 135. 
102 See Stone, supra note 98, at 216; but see Marta Ujvari, Cambridge Change and Sortal Essentialism, 
5 METAPHYSICA 25 (2004) (defending a reconstructed version of Burke’s argument). 
103 See Stone, supra note 98, at 216–17 (explaining that his response to Burke “may discourage 
philosophers who hope to deploy essentialism against Chrysippus, but it will encourage those who 
believe in the viability of sortal essentialism or wish to better understand it”). 
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claim’s embodiments. As a general matter, the patent system treats the concept of 
an embodiment as maximal. Given the claim, “A thing comprising elements A and 
B,” a thing T consisting solely of extensions of terms A, B, C and D counts as one 
embodiment (A+B+C+D), not four embodiments (A+B, A+B+C, A+B+D, 
A+B+C+D).104 Only the whole thing T falls under the sortal S corresponding to the 
claim language, which picks out embodiments and only embodiments of the claim. 
Assuming for the moment that S is an essential sortal, it is straightforward to 
identify the essential properties of T within this account, namely T’s possession of 
extensions of terms A and B and the lack of another, larger, thing comprising 
extensions of terms A and B, of which T is a proper part. This is just another way of 
saying that T is a complete thing that falls within the literal scope of the claim. 
Patent law’s notion of essentiality for elements and limitations that determine the 
scope of a claim thus maps naturally onto the metaphysical notion of essentiality 
for properties of things that fall under the corresponding sortal, i.e., embodiments 
of the claim. As Part II.B explains, such essential properties may include causal 
powers and other dispositional properties. 
The patent system is deeply committed to the view that the language of a 
claim corresponds to an essential sortal. The patent system does not entertain the 
ontological possibility of worlds in which an embodiment of a claimed invention 
exists, yet lacks an element of the claim.105 As far as the patent system is 
concerned, the embodiments of a claim could not have existed without falling 
under the sortal corresponding to the claim language. A worldview in which it is 
metaphysically possible for an embodiment of a claim to come into existence 
when, and only when, all elements of the claim are present, might seem strange to 
many philosophers,106 but this worldview follows concomitantly from the 
ontological reading of the predicate “make” that suffuses patent doctrine.107 
                                                          
 
104 See FABER, supra note 71, § 2:5, at 2-15 (discussing interpretation of “comprising”). 
105 See, e.g., Peeler v. Miller, 535 F.2d 647, 651 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (“[W]ithout an actual reduction to 
practice there is no invention in existence . . . .”). But cf. Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., 124 F.3d 1429, 
1433 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[R]eduction to practice is not necessarily a prerequisite to application of the on-
sale bar.”). 
106 See generally DAVID K. LEWIS, COUNTERFACTUALS (2001) (illustrating the wide range of 
metaphysical possibility). 
107 See, e.g., Bayer AG v. Housey Pharm., 340 F.3d 1367, 1372 nn.5–6 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (citing RANDOM 
HOUSE WEBSTER’S UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1172 (2d ed. 1998) definitions of “make” as “to bring 
into existence” and “cause to exist or happen”); Radio Corp. of America v. Andrea, 79 F.2d 626, 628 
(2d Cir. 1935) (Swan, J.) (“No wrong is done the patentee until the combination is formed. His 
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In characterizing claim language in this way, no distinction is drawn between 
product and process claims, and none is necessary. While the discussion thus far 
has exclusively cited material objects as examples of things that can fall under a 
sortal, the language of a process claim, which recites a series of steps, can also be 
recognized as corresponding to an essential sortal. The items that fall under such a 
sortal are series of events covered by the corresponding process claim, where each 
such event is the performance of one of the recited steps. The patent system regards 
these events as concrete individual things108 that exist in time and space.109 Events 
can thus be accorded the same ontological status as material objects, at least in their 
capacity of exemplifying claim elements. 
The treatment of events as particulars coheres with the ontological worldview 
of philosopher Donald Davidson.110 According to Davidson, events have a causal 
principle of individuation: “[E]vents are identical if and only if they have exactly 
the same causes and effects.”111 Despite the apparent strictness of this principle, 
any form of causal evidence, including “logic alone, or logic plus physics, or 
almost anything else . . . depending on the descriptions provided,” can establish the 
identity of an individual event.112 When this causal evidence is available, Davidson 
concludes it is reasonable to describe events as things falling under a sortal,113 
inasmuch as “the individuation of events poses no problems worse in principle than 
the problems posed by individuation of material objects.”114 As we will see in the 
                                                                                                                                      
 
monopoly does not cover the manufacture or sale of separate elements capable of being, but never 
actually, associated to form the invention.”) (emphasis added); accord Deepsouth Packing Co. v. 
Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 529 (1972) (quoting Radio Corp. with approval as “the leading case” on 
the construction of “make” in § 271 of the Patent Act). 
108 Cf. Collins, supra note 23, at 501 n.18 (2008) (using the term “things” to encompass both objects 
(products) and events (processes) described by patent claims). 
109 See, e.g., NTP, Inc. v. Research in Motion, Ltd., 418 F.3d 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In NTP, a patentee 
asserted method claims that each recited a step that had been performed, if at all, only in Canada. Id. at 
1318. Holding that “a process cannot be used ‘within’ the United States as required by section 271(a) 
unless each of the steps is performed within this country,” the court found the claims not infringed as a 
matter of law. Id. 
110 DONALD DAVIDSON, ESSAYS ON ACTIONS AND EVENTS 105–203 (2001) (presenting and defending 
the position that events are particulars). 
111 Id. at 179. 
112 Id. at 179–80. 
113 Id. (“Individuation at its best requires sorts or kinds that give a principle for counting. But here again, 
events come out well enough. . . .”). 
114 Id. at 180. 
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next section, the patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts” demands such causal 
evidence of the embodiments of every claim.115 Process claims therefore do not 
raise special ontological problems, provided that Davidson’s treatment of events is 
consistent with the patent system’s other commitments. 
B. The Ontological Status of Embodiments 
The conclusion that embodiments exemplify claims immediately implies that 
embodiments hold the ontological status of particulars, i.e., “something (not 
necessarily an object) that instantiates but is not itself instantiated.”116 But the 
patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts” requires that embodiments be capable of 
more than instantiation. For an invention to have operative utility, an invention 
must be “capable of being used to effect the object proposed.”117 To have beneficial 
utility, it must be “capable of providing some identifiable benefit.”118 Thus, to be 
included among the “useful Arts,” an invention must have the capability, or power, 
to cause “a beneficial result or effect” when it is used.119 Since to use a claimed 
invention is just to use one of its embodiments,120 the utility of a claimed invention 
is grounded in the causal powers of the claim’s embodiments. Our characterization 
                                                          
 
115 See infra text accompanying notes 126–34. 
116 E.J. Lowe, The Metaphysics of Abstract Objects, 92 J. PHIL. 509, 518 (1995); see also Nari Lee, 
Patent Eligible Subject Matter Reconfiguration and the Emergence of Proprietarian Norms: The Patent 
Eligibility of Business Methods, 45 IDEA 321, 325 (2005) (“What patent law gives is property-like 
protection on the instantiation of ideas.”); Jerome T. Tao, Comment, Theories of Computer Program 
Patentability, 7 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 291, 300 (1991) (restating Pamela 
Samuelson’s view that “‘[i]nstantiation’ is defined as the embodiment of the inventive concept.”). 
117 Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1180 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted). 
118 Juicy Whip, Inc. v. Orange Bang, Inc., 185 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“An invention is 
‘useful’ under section 101 if it is capable of providing some identifiable benefit.”). 
119 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 n.7 (1981) (citing Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 
(1854) (“It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing a beneficial 
result or effect, that a patent is granted . . . .”)); Stiftung, 945 F.2d at 1180 (noting the constitutional 
dimension of the utility requirement). 
120 See, e.g., Zenith Elec. Corp. v. PDI Commc’ns Sys., Inc., 522 F.3d 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (citation 
omitted) (explaining that § 102(b) public use bar turns on “whether the public use related to a device 
that embodied the invention.”); Timothy R. Holbrook, Liability for the “Threat of a Sale”: Assessing 
Patent Infringement for Offering to Sell an Invention and Implications for the On-Sale Patentability Bar 
and Other Forms of Infringement, 43 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 751, 813–14 (2003) (reasoning that under a 
plain meaning interpretation of § 271(a), an infringing use requires “a physical embodiment of the 
patented invention”). 
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of the ontological status of embodiments therefore focuses on the patent system’s 
metaphysical commitments regarding the nature and role of their causal powers. 
1. The Causal Powers of Embodiments 
The term causal power is not in the vocabulary of patent law,121 but the 
concept is familiar to patent doctrine. A causal power is simply a disposition to 
engage in a process that relates a cause and an effect.122 That a claim’s 
embodiments have causal powers follows from the patent system’s attribution of “a 
beneficial result or effect” to the use of an embodiment of the claimed invention, 
i.e., as a “practicable method or means of producing” the beneficial effect.123 
As a preliminary matter, it is necessary to note that the causal powers of a 
claim’s embodiments may vary, at least to the extent that the use of certain 
embodiments, under some or all conditions, might not achieve the intended purpose 
of the claimed invention.124 The presence of such inoperative embodiments within 
the claim scope need not negate enablement however as long as their number does 
not “in effect force[] one of ordinary skill in the art to experiment unduly in order 
to practice the claimed invention.”125 
An enabling patent disclosure explains how to employ the causal powers of 
embodiments by “teach[ing] those skilled in the art how to make and use the full 
scope of the claimed invention without undue experimentation.”126 Given that 
every claim has infinitely many embodiments,127 it is neither necessary nor possible 
for the disclosure to provide a specific teaching for every embodiment within the 
                                                          
 
121 A search on Westlaw’s Federal Circuit decision (CTAF) database finds no occurrences of the phrase 
“causal power.” 
122 See BRIAN ELLIS, THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE 48 (2002). 
123 Diamond, 450 U.S. at 183; cf. 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.03[2] (2012) (“In its primary significance, 
the exclusion of principles and abstract ideas merely emphasizes the fundamental concept that patents 
are issued only for new means to achieve useful results.”). 
124 See In re Dinh-Nguyen, 492 F.2d 856, 858–59 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (“It is not a function of the claims to 
specifically exclude . . . possible inoperative substances . . . .”). 
125 Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569, 1576–77 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
126 Martek Biosciences Corp. v. Nutrinova, Inc., 579 F.3d 1363, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citing In re 
Wright, 999 F.2d 1557, 1561 (Fed. Cir. 1993)). 
127 See Tun-Jen Chiang, The Rules and Standards of Patentable Subject Matter, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 
1353, 1391 (2010); Lefstin, supra note 29 at 1168–74. 
U N I V E R S I T Y  O F  P I T T S B U R G H  L A W  R E V I E W  
 




ISSN 0041-9915 (print) 1942-8405 (online) ● DOI 10.5195/lawreview.2012.194 
http://lawreview.law.pitt.edu 
scope of the claim.128 Patent applicants therefore employ generic disclosures to 
teach those skilled in the art how to employ the causal powers of a claim’s 
embodiments. Such disclosures are considered sufficient as long as undue 
experimentation is not required to achieve operability.129 Each embodiment within 
the scope of a generic disclosure possesses certain causal powers that are employed 
in using the claim’s embodiments as taught by the disclosure, even though 
sometimes those causal powers may prove insufficient for operability in actual use 
circumstances. Such causal powers may be said to be essential to the embodiment, 
because the embodiment necessarily possesses them in virtue of being an example 
of the kind defined by the claim.130 
Even without an explicit description of the cause and effect in question, a 
disclosure may be found sufficient to teach one or more of the causal powers 
employed in practicing an invention, through a theory of inherent disclosure.131 To 
show inherency, the effect in question “must inevitably happen.”132 For this 
purpose, it is sufficient for the disclosure that the effect in question is “the natural 
result flowing from the operation as taught.”133 Causal powers of embodiments that 
manifest natural dispositions therefore exist necessarily, insofar as entities 
possessing such dispositions are involved in “the operation as taught” and the 
                                                          
 
128 There is no requirement that an enabling patent disclosure provide information pertaining to the 
enablement of specific embodiments (i.e., “working examples”). See In re Long, 368 F.2d 892, 895 
(C.C.P.A. 1966) (“If by ‘specific embodiment’ is meant a working example, then the same is not 
required where sufficient working procedure has been set forth showing that one skilled in the art may 
prepare the claimed article without undue experimentation.”). 
129 As the Federal Circuit has explained, despite the lack of specific enabling information regarding 
“every possible variant of the claimed invention, . . . the artisan’s knowledge of the prior art and routine 
experimentation can often fill gaps, interpolate between embodiments, and perhaps even extrapolate 
beyond the disclosed embodiments, depending upon the predictability of the art.” AK Steel Corp. v. 
Sollac & Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244 (Fed. Cir. 2003); see also In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. 
Cir. 1988) (listing factors, including predictability of the art, to be considered in determining whether a 
disclosure would require undue experimentation). 
130 See ELLIS, supra note 122, at 12 (defining “the kind essence of a thing” as “the set of its properties in 
virtue of which it is a thing of the kind it is” and subsequently using the term “essential properties” to 
refer to “kind essences”). 
131 See Pingree v. Hull, 518 F.2d 624, 627–28 (C.C.P.A. 1975) (applying inherency doctrine in 
interference context to find enablement by junior party). The inherency doctrine is more commonly 
applied in the context of finding teachings in prior art references. See, e.g., Cont’l Can Co. v. Monsanto 
Co., 948 F.2d 1264, 1268 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
132 Pingree, 518 F.2d at 627. 
133 Id. at 628 (citing Hansgirg v. Kemmer, 102 F.2d 212, 214 (C.C.P.A. 1939)). 
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effects of such causal powers “must inevitably happen.” Thus the causal laws of 
nature are necessary in the metaphysical sense: to say an effect is a natural result 
necessarily entails that it is also an inevitable result.134 
2. Scientific Essentialism 
The patent system’s recognition of essential causal powers in embodiments 
and the necessity of laws of nature contrasts with the “regularity account” 
attributed to David Hume, which informs most modern theories of causation.135 
This so-called Humean136 worldview holds that objects have no essential 
dispositional properties, the behavior of objects are completely determined by the 
laws of nature, laws of nature are contingent on regularities in the ways objects 
behave, and causal relationships are nothing more than connections between 
logically independent events.137 Philosopher Brian David Ellis describes the 
Humean worldview as “still-dominant” and refers to it as “passivism,” in that it is 
                                                          
 
134 See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1580 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“This court . . . believes that the laws 
of thermodynamics do not brook contradiction.”); cf. ELLIS, supra note 122, at 59 (“Essentialists believe 
that . . . the laws of nature are metaphysically necessary, because anything that belongs to a natural kind 
is logically required (or is necessarily disposed) to behave as its essential properties dictate.”). 
The metaphysical necessity of the natural dispositions of naturally occurring substances is also 
implicit in the “purification” doctrine relating to the exclusion of products of nature from patentable 
subject matter. An artificially purified form of a naturally occurring substance will not be found 
patentable unless it differs “in kind” (and not merely “in degree”) from the impure form found in nature, 
see Parke-Davis & Co. v. H.K. Mulford & Co., 189 F. 95, 103 (S.D.N.Y. 1911), aff’d, 196 F. 496 (2d 
Cir. 1912), and such a difference in kind “will normally be found only if the new pure compound has an 
entirely new utility from the old one.” 1 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 1.02[9] (2012). Thus, where purification 
alters the essential causal powers of a natural substance (at least to the extent that it can be used to 
produce a beneficial result or effect not manifested in nature), patent doctrine recognizes the existence 
of a new, non-natural kind, of which the new pure substance is an example and the old impure substance 
is not. 
135 DANIEL M. HAUSMAN, CAUSAL ASYMMETRIES 36 (1998) (“Hume’s theory is the starting point for 
most modern treatments of causation, and the problems his theory must surmount are problems for all 
theories of causation . . . .”). 
136 Compare Alexander Rosenberg, Hume and the Philosophy of Science, in THE CAMBRIDGE 
COMPANION TO HUME 64, 73–78 (David Fate Norton ed., 1993) (describing Hume’s views that “notions 
of efficacy or causal power or causal necessity in the objects are without the requisite pedigree in 
experience to be meaningful” and that “laws are the instantiation of contingent regularities whose 
evidential strength . . . sustains an attribution of some sort of necessity to the connections they report”), 
with TOM L. BEAUCHAMP & ALEXANDER ROSENBERG, HUME AND THE PROBLEM OF CAUSATION 32–37 
(1981) (arguing that Hume himself did not hold these views). 
137 ELLIS, supra note 122, at 59–60. 
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“[t]he view that things in nature are essentially passive, and obedient to nature’s 
laws.”138 According to Ellis, 
To be a passivist, one must believe that inanimate things are capable of acting 
only as directed—depending, for example, on how they are pushed or pulled 
around by God, or by the forces of nature (or, in Hume’s case, by what the laws 
of nature happen to be). A passivist therefore believes that the tendencies of 
things to behave as they do can never be inherent in the things themselves. They 
must always be imposed on them from the outside. The forces of nature, for 
example, are always seen as being external to the objects on which they act. 
They act on them, or between them, but the things themselves are never the 
source of any activity.139 
Since passivism attributes the behavior of embodiments entirely to the laws of 
nature, a passivist views every invention as nothing more than the manifestation of 
a newly discovered aspect of a law of nature. This perspective is deeply 
incompatible with longstanding patentable subject matter doctrine, which holds that 
“[p]henomena of nature, though just discovered . . . are not patentable, as they are 
the basic tools of scientific and technological work”140 and regards “manifestations 
of laws of nature” as “free to all men and reserved exclusively to none.”141 While 
patentable inventions may arise “from the application of [a] law of nature to a new 
and useful end,”142 the notion of an embodiment capable of applying a law of 
nature to a new and useful end is foreign to passivism. Equally foreign is the idea 
that the use of an embodiment of a patentable invention represents “a practical 
method or means of producing a beneficial result or effect.”143 If the previous 
section’s account of the causal powers of embodiments is more or less accurate, 
then there is no place for passivism in the patent system. 
The patent system’s worldview also differs from that of classical Aristotelian 
essentialism, in which everything that exists by nature has an essential telos, or 
                                                          
 
138 See id. at 2. 
139 Id. at 2–3. 
140 See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972). 
141 See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948). 
142 See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188 n.11 (1981). 
143 See id. at 183 n.7 (citing Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 268 (1854)). 
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purpose, i.e., “that for the sake of which a thing . . . exists.”144 Patent doctrine 
contemplates the existence of objects without essential purposes; it does not 
“conceive of the world as a grand teleological system in which the parts exist for 
the sake of a whole.”145 In granting patents for the “new use of a known . . . 
machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material,”146 the patent system 
acknowledges that the causal powers of objects may be made to serve a new 
purpose. In so doing, the patent system generally declines to treat the new purpose 
as an essential property that can, by itself, distinguish the claimed invention over 
the prior art;147 the claimed method of using the old object must also recite a new 
manipulative step.148 
A patent claim may state “a purpose or intended use” for the invention in its 
preamble, but such a stated purpose generally has no independent status as an 
essential property of an embodiment of the claim.149 Preambular language is 
considered “essential,” and therefore held to affect claim scope, only to the extent 
that it may be found to state “essential structure or steps” of the claimed invention 
or to give “life, meaning, and vitality” to a claim that would otherwise fail to 
meaningfully define essential structure or steps.150 Accordingly, infringement 
                                                          
 
144 See ELLIS, supra note 122, at 11–12 (citation omitted). 
145 See id. at 13. 
146 See 35 U.S.C. § 100(b). 
147 See David A. Kelly, What Constitutes a “New Use” of a Known Composition and Should a 
Patentee’s Purported Objective Make Any Difference?, 21 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. 
L.J. 319, 322–32 (2005) (discussing cases supporting the principle that “when the claim recites using an 
old composition and the ‘use’ is directed to a result or property of that composition, then the claim is 
inherently anticipated.”). 
148 See id. at 336 & n.77 (citing Integra Life Sciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1846, 
1850–51 (S.D. Cal. 1999), aff’d in relevant part, 331 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2003), vacated on other 
grounds, 545 U.S. 193 (2005)); but see Jansen v. Rexall Sundown, Inc., 342 F.3d 1329, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 
2003) (construing a preambular “statement of the intentional purpose for which the method must be 
performed” as a claim limitation). 
149 See Rowe v. Dror, 112 F.3d 473, 478 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“[W]here a patentee defines a structurally 
complete invention in the claim body and uses the preamble only to state a purpose or intended use for 
the invention, the preamble is not a claim limitation.”); see also Catalina Mktg. Int’l, Inc. v. 
Coolsavings.com, Inc., 289 F.3d 801, 809 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (“[T]he patentability of apparatus or 
composition claims depends on the claimed structure, not on the use or purpose of that structure.”). 
150 See, e.g., Vizio, Inc. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 605 F.3d 1330, 1340–41 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted) (finding that claims “would have little meaning without the intended objective” recited in the 
preamble and that preambular language “does not ‘only add[] an intended use,’ but rather, states an 
essential limitation to the claims”); Griffin v. Bertina, 285 F.3d 1029, 1033 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (finding 
that “diagnosis is . . . the essence of this invention” because “its appearance in the count gives ‘life and 
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doctrine does not treat a preambular purpose as an essential property of a patent 
claim, because “[i]ntent is not an element of infringement.”151 
By recognizing causal powers but not purposes as essential properties of 
embodiments, the patent system appears to be committed to a third metaphysical 
worldview, known as scientific essentialism. In the words of Ellis, who jointly 
coined the term,152 scientific essentialism holds that “there are genuine causal 
powers, capacities, and propensities that . . . exist in nature as universals, and are 
therefore the same in all possible worlds.”153 For example, gravitational mass and 
charge are properties of an object that determine its causal role in generating 
gravitational and electromagnetic fields, respectively, and hence the effects it has 
on other objects present in these fields.154 
Scientific essentialism holds that there are natural kinds,155 i.e., kinds that are 
“independent of human interests, language and epistemic considerations, and 
thereby reflect true divisions of the world.”156 Paradigmatic examples of natural 
kinds include “water,” “electron,” and “planet,” because these kinds “are out there 
in the natural world, not just in our way of thinking about the world.”157 Scientific 
essentialism holds that scientific explanations are based at least in part on 
“postulates concerning the essential natures of the fundamental natural kinds of 
                                                                                                                                      
 
meaning’ to the manipulative steps”); see also Catalina, 289 F.3d at 808 (“[C]lear reliance on the 
preamble during prosecution to distinguish the claimed invention from the prior art transforms the 
preamble into a claim limitation because such reliance indicates use of the preamble to define, in part, 
the claimed invention.”). 
151 Hilton Davis Chem. Co. v. Warner-Jenkinson Co., 62 F.3d 1512, 1519 (Fed. Cir. 1995), rev’d on 
other grounds, 520 U.S. 17 (1997); see also Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. 
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“Actions predicated on direct patent infringement, however, do not 
require any showing of intent to infringe; instead, knowledge and intent are considered only with respect 
to damages.”); Warner-Jenkinson v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 35 (1997) (“Application of 
the doctrine of equivalents, therefore, is akin to determining literal infringement, and neither requires 
proof of intent.”); Kelly, supra note 147, at 333–34 (discussing cases). 
152 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 57 n.16. 
153 Id. at 48. 
154 See id. at 6. 
155 See id. at 19 (explaining that “[n]atural kinds clearly have a central place” in the ontology underlying 
scientific essentialism). 
156 RICHARD A. RICHARDS, THE SPECIES PROBLEM: A PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 149 (2010). 
157 Id. at 150. 
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objects and processes occurring in the world.”158 On this view, the task of science 
“is to discover what makes a thing the kind of thing it is and hence to explain why 
it behaves or has the properties it has.”159 For example, science has discovered that 
an electron “has a certain mass and a certain charge essentially,” and must therefore 
“generate [certain gravitational and electromagnetic] fields in any world in which it 
might exist, and have precisely the same effects on things of just the same 
kinds.”160 Because a disposition to generate these fields is essential to the electron, 
“[i]f a particle lacked this causal power, essentialists say, then, whatever else it 
might be, it would not be an electron.”161 
Consistent with the patent system’s worldview,162 scientific essentialism holds 
that “[t]he laws of nature are not contingent, but metaphysically necessary.”163 This 
is because laws of nature are simply “descriptions of natural kinds of processes 
arising from the intrinsic properties of things belonging to natural kinds.”164 Thus, 
“[i]f the laws of nature were different, the things existing in the world would have 
to be different,”165 because, inter alia, their causal powers, capacities and 
propensities would be different.166 Electrons would not exist, because nothing 
would have an electron’s essential causal powers.167 
This is not to say that causal powers cannot vary among different things of the 
same kind. While the causal powers and other dispositional properties of “the 
“most elementary things” of a natural kind are “fixed by their essential natures,” 
scientific essentialism contemplates variability in the causal powers of “more 
complicated things.”168 “One cannot . . . teach a copper atom or a proton any new 
                                                          
 
158 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 57 n.16. 
159 Id. at 55. 
160 Id. at 6. 
161 ELLIS, supra note 122, at 13. 
162 See supra text accompanying note 134. 
163 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 7. 
164 Id. 
165 Id. 
166 See supra text accompanying note 153. 
167 See supra text accompanying notes 159–60. 
168 See ELLIS, supra note 122, at 142. 
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tricks,”169 but the causal powers of a more complex object may change because of 
its history or circumstances. For example, an iron object may become fatigued, and 
therefore brittle, or magnetized, and therefore capable of attracting other pieces of 
iron.170 Furthermore, even when an object, such as a mousetrap spring, actually 
possesses a given causal power, the history or circumstances surrounding the 
object’s use may affect whether the causal power is manifested as an intended 
effect, as Ellis describes: 
If the mousetrap is not set off by the taking of the cheese, then presumably the 
disturbance was not enough to release the causal power latent in the spring. 
Unless there are extraordinary defeating circumstances, there can be no question 
of the catch being released and the mousetrap not snapping shut.171 
Scientific essentialism can therefore account for the potentially wide 
variations among the causal powers of embodiments of a given patent claim and 
the manifestations of those causal powers as effects.172 Patent claims are non-
natural kinds of relatively complex objects and processes, and the making of an 
embodiment may entail introducing changes to the causal powers of many 
constituent elements.173 Thus the causal powers of different embodiments of the 
same claim may vary, depending on the ways the causal powers of natural kinds 
are brought into play and the circumstances in which each embodiment is made. 
Because of this variation in causal powers, some embodiments of a claimed 
invention may even be inoperable within the range of circumstances of the 
invention’s intended use. Some mousetraps may fail to snap shut when they 
should—but it is always possible to build a better one.174 
                                                          
 
169 ELLIS, supra note 82, at 21. 
170 See ELLIS, supra note 122, at 142. 
171 See id. 
172 See supra text accompanying note 124. 
173 See, e.g., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., 535 U.S. 722, 728–29 (2002) 
(describing claim limitation requiring that “the outer shell of the device, the sleeve, be made of a 
magnetizable material” and noting that the commercial embodiment of the claim uses a “magnetized 
alloy”). 
174 But see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 19 (1966) (noting that due to advances in the field, 
“[h]e who seeks to build a better mousetrap today has a long path to tread before reaching the Patent 
Office.”). 
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While the causal powers of embodiments may vary widely due to complexity 
and circumstances, scientific essentialism does imply that all embodiments, along 
with other objects and processes of non-natural kinds, are ontologically grounded 
in the fundamental properties that exist in our world: 
All objects and processes that do not belong to natural kinds depend 
ontologically on objects and processes that do, since those very same objects and 
processes could not exist, or occur, in any world in which any of the natural 
kinds of things of which it is constituted did not exist. Therefore the kinds of 
objects and processes that actually exist or occur could not exist or occur in any 
possible world except one with the same fundamental property universals and 
the same spatio-temporal-energy structural possibilities as ours.175 
According to scientific essentialism, the fundamental dispositional properties of 
things in our world and spatio-temporal structure of our world are manifested in 
“instances of the most fundamental natural kinds of processes.”176 By leaving to 
science the task of identifying and explaining the natural kinds of processes that 
actually exist,177 scientific essentialism entails an epistemological commitment to 
scientific realism,178 as discussed in the next section. 
3. Scientific Realism and Unobserved Embodiments 
Scientific realism is “the view that our best scientific theories give 
approximately true descriptions of both observable and unobservable aspects of a 
mind-independent world”179 or, in other words, “the doctrine that scientific theories 
are to be taken seriously, in particular with respect to ontological commitment.”180 
As an epistemological thesis, scientific realism holds that “[t]he things our best 
                                                          
 
175 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 252. 
176 See id. at 217–18. 
177 See supra text accompanying note 159. 
178 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 145–46 (explaining that scientific essentialism entails a form of 
scientific realism that may appropriately be called “essentialist realism”). 
179 ANJAN CHAKRAVARTTY, A METAPHYSICS FOR SCIENTIFIC REALISM: KNOWING THE UNOBSERVABLE 
212 (2007). 
180 Richard Creath, Taking Theories Seriously, 62 SYNTHESE 317, 317 (1985). 
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scientific theories tell us about entities and processes are decent descriptions of the 
way the world really is.”181 
Scientific essentialism’s epistemological commitment to scientific realism 
justifies its taking the causal powers of the electron to be real essences of a natural 
kind.182 Implicit in scientific essentialism’s view that “[u]nit charge, unit mass, and 
spin 1/2 are essential properties of electrons, and electrons are by their very nature 
bound to act and interact as these properties determine,”183 is scientific realism’s 
view that electrons exist. While no one has ever directly observed an electron,184 
scientific realists reason that “[i]f the world behaves as if things like atoms and 
electrons exist, then the best explanation of this fact is that they really do exist.”185 
This appeal to scientific theory186 is often described as the “argument from the best 
explanation”187 or “inference to the best explanation.”188 According to Ellis, the 
argument from the best explanation is the “main argument” for scientific realism.189 
Patent doctrine evidences a strong commitment to scientific realism. As long 
as an assertion of a claimed invention’s utility is not “incredible in light of the 
knowledge of the art, or factually misleading,” the Patent Office and the courts do 
not need to observe an embodiment to satisfy themselves that embodiments of the 
                                                          
 
181 CHAKRAVARTTY, supra note 179, at 9; see also THE PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA 
686 (Sahotra Sarkar & Jessica Pfeifer eds. 2006) (“[Scientific r]ealism takes the explanatory and 
predictive success of theories to warrant an ontological commitment to the existence of the entities they 
posit.”). 
182 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 54–55. 
183 See id. at 48–49; see also supra text accompanying note 161. 
184 See generally THEODORE ARABATZIS, REPRESENTING ELECTRONS: A BIOGRAPHICAL APPROACH TO 
THEORETICAL ENTITIES (2006) (providing a history of theoretical representations of the electron as an 
unobservable entity). 
185 See ELLIS, supra note 82, at 146. 
186 See supra text accompanying note 181; Creath, supra note 180, at 317 (“If the theories we adopt say 
that there are protons or pi-mesons, then we are ontologically committed to things of these sorts every 
bit as much as we are ontologically committed to peanuts and pachyderms by our views at the 
observational level.”). 
187 See BRIAN ELLIS, THE METAPHYSICS OF SCIENTIFIC REALISM 24 (2009). 
188 See PETER LIPTON, INFERENCE TO THE BEST EXPLANATION 1 (1991) (describing inference to the best 
explanation as the practice whereby “[b]eginning with the evidence available to us, we infer what 
would, if true, provide the best explanation of that evidence.”). 
189 See ELLIS, supra note 187, at 24, 30. 
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claim can exist and be capable of causing the asserted beneficial effect.190 
Accordingly, the Patent Office advises examiners: 
With the exception of cases involving perpetual motion, a model is not 
ordinarily required by the Office to demonstrate the operability of a device. If 
operability of a device is questioned, the applicant must establish it to the 
satisfaction of the examiner, but he or she may choose his or her own way of so 
doing.191 
In advising the public, however, the Patent Office reserves its right to require a 
working model: 
A working model, or other physical exhibit, may be required by the Office if 
deemed necessary. This is not done very often. A working model may be 
requested in the case of applications for patent for alleged perpetual motion 
devices.192 
                                                          
 
190 See In re Isaacs, 347 F.2d 887, 890 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (citing In re Citron, 325 F.2d 248, 253 (C.C.P.A. 
1963)); Sean B. Seymore, Patently Impossible, 64 VAND. L. REV. 1491, 1500–07 (2011) (describing the 
Patent Office’s examination rubric for the operability requirement). 
Realism about unobserved embodiments has not been a permanent fixture in the patent system, 
which required applicants to furnish working models of their inventions, where possible, between 1836 
and 1880. See Kendall J. Dood, Patent Models and the Patent Law: 1790–1880 (Part I), 65 J. PAT. OFF. 
SOC’Y 187, 187 (1983). A few years before dispensing with the requirement, Patent Office 
Commissioner Ellis Spear noted: 
It will be necessary only that provision be made for requiring models in cases 
where the capability of the machine to operate is called into question, or 
where the Examiner is in doubt as to the sufficiency of the drawings, or 
where models may be necessary for ready illustration on appeal, or 
interference cases. 
Dood, supra note 11, at 271 (emphasis added). 
Many issued patent claims expressly recite theoretical entities that would be unobservable even in 
a completed embodiment. For example, a search of the Patent Office’s PatFT database shows that the 
word “electron” appears in the claims of 49,181 patents, http://patft.uspto.gov/netahtml/PTO/search-
bool.html (last visited Mar. 25, 2013). 
191 U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING PROCEDURE § 608.03 (July 
2010) [hereinafter MPEP]. 
192 General Information Concerning Patents, U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE (2011), http:// 
www.uspto.gov/patents/resources/general_info_concerning_patents.pdf. 
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Consistent with scientific realism’s epistemological grounding in “the best 
explanation” informed by “our best scientific theories,” the patent system may 
require proof of utility where there are “factual reasons which would lead one 
skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of operability.”193 
For example, the “highly unusual nature” of an invention194 or “considerable 
doubt” within the scientific community195 may justify a requirement that the 
applicant provide proof of utility. Except in the case of alleged perpetual motion 
machines,196 such proof does not necessarily require the demonstration of a 
working model197 or a correct account of the invention’s theory of operation,198 but 
must convince one skilled in the art of the asserted utility.199 If an applicant does 
rely on scientific theories to show operability, the theories must be part of the 
“knowledge of the art,”200 and one of skill in the art must be able to recognize that 
the theories are applicable to the claimed invention.201 
                                                          
 
193 In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d 1222, 1224 (C.C.P.A. 1975). 
194 See In re Houghton, 433 F.2d 820, 821 (C.C.P.A. 1970). 
195 See In re Dash, 118 Fed. Appx. 488 (Fed. Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 346 (2005) 
(unpublished opinion); cf. In re Marzocchi, 439 F.2d 220, 223 (C.C.P.A. 1971) (dicta) (stating that 
unpredictability of chemical reactions may create reasonable doubt as to enablement where a broad 
representation “is, on its face, contrary to generally accepted scientific principles.”). 
196 See supra text accompanying notes 191–92. 
197 See supra note 191 and accompanying text; see also In re Houghton, 433 F.2d at 821 (noting that 
Patent Office did not require working model as proof of utility). 
198 See Newman v. Quigg, 877 F.2d 1575, 1581–82 (Fed. Cir. 1989). 
199 See In re Brana, 51 F.3d 1560, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1995). 
200 See supra text accompanying note 190; see also BlackLight Power, Inc. v. Rogan, 295 F.3d 1269, 
1271 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (holding that Patent Office’s withdrawal of patent from issuance was not 
unreasonable in light of examining group director’s determination that “‘the applicant was claiming the 
electron going to a lower orbital in a fashion that I knew was contrary to the known laws of physics and 
chemistry.’”); In re Houghton, 433 F.2d at 821 n.1 (finding applicant’s reliance on published articles 
purporting to provide theoretical support for invention “not persuasive” where “most of these articles 
were authored by appellant, and none of them appear in the record.”). 
201 See In re Houghton, 433 F.2d at 821 (finding claimed hovercraft inoperable where applicant 
“presented no evidence from any skilled persons other than himself to show that such persons would be 
convinced for the practical applicability of the [disclosed aerodynamic] equations to a flying machine”); 
cf. In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973, 978 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (citation omitted) (where a claimed device is of 
“such a nature that it could not be tested by any known scientific principles . . . it is incumbent on the 
applicant to demonstrate the workability and utility of the device and make clear the principles on which 
it operates.”). 
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My description of the patent system’s ontology thus far has characterized the 
ontological status of claims and their embodiments under settled patent doctrine. 
Claims are non-natural kinds with corresponding essential sortals; embodiments are 
particulars that have essential causal powers in virtue of being examples of those 
kinds and falling under those sortals. Operative embodiments have utility in virtue 
of their essential causal powers. Other embodiments of the same claim also have 
these essential causal powers, but may be inoperative due to wide variations in 
causal powers and in the history or circumstances of reduction to practice and use. 
When a claim is filed, typically none of the embodiments described by the claim is 
observable to the patent system. Nevertheless, the patent system is committed to 
scientific essentialism and scientific realism, and therefore accepts that operative 
embodiments of a claim can exist, without knowledge or observation of the actual 
existence of any such entities, based on an argument from the best explanation. 
As an indispensable guide to the interpretation of claim language,202 and as a 
statement of facts about the potential and actual existence of embodiments and 
kinds of embodiments, the specification of a filed patent application plays a vital 
role in incurring and warranting ontological commitments to claims and their 
embodiments. In the next Part, I undertake to show how the patent specification’s 
ontological role serves in part to explain the complexity of the demands put upon it 
by patent law’s adequate disclosure doctrines. 
III. THE ONTOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION 
REQUIREMENT 
A. Written Description as a Definitional Requirement 
The complexity of the patent system’s demand for adequate disclosure is 
apparent from the fact that a simple set-theoretic inquiry as to whether all 
embodiments within the claim are enabled will not suffice.203 This is not only 
                                                                                                                                      
 
At least one leading patent scholar has recently criticized the Patent Office’s operability inquiry 
as too subjective and tending to lag behind rapidly developing scientific fields. See Seymore, supra note 
190, at 1507–23. 
202 See supra text accompanying note 31. 
203 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1159–67 (contrasting enablement doctrine with other patent doctrines 
that he says are amenable to a set-theoretic characterization). For example, if we “[t]ake a claim reciting 
particular properties, and call the set of all possible things or events characterized by those properties as 
x,” and “[l]et y be the set of all things the accused infringer has made, used, sold, or offered for sale 
within the United States,” then “[t]he claim is infringed if and only if x and y intersect” as shown in the 
figure below. 
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because every claim contains some non-enabled subject matter,204 but also because 
a claim’s embodiments may be adequately enabled even though its scope bears no 
relation to what the inventor actually invented.205 
In his 2008 article The Formal Structure of Patent Law and the Limits of 
Enablement,206 Jeffrey Lefstin persuasively shows that the written description 
requirement brings needed coherence to the adequate disclosure inquiry by 
providing a legal test directed to “the scope of the claim itself” rather than “a 
particular embodiment or collection of embodiments.”207 Specifically, Lefstin 
interprets the written description requirement as a demand that the disclosure 
provide adequate “definitional information” concerning the scope of the claim.208 
According to Lefstin, the Federal Circuit provided guidance regarding the 
written description’s definitional function in its 1997 Lilly decision.209 Prior to 
                                                                                                                                      
 
 
Id. at 1159–60. 
204 See id. at 1175 (“Due to the infinite scope of patent claims, a patentee certainly need not, and in most 
cases cannot, enable every embodiment falling within the ‘full scope’ of the claims.”); see supra text 
accompanying notes 124–25. 
205 See id. at 1194 (emphasis omitted). For example, Lefstin points out that the following claim would be 
enabled: “All material objects which are enabled by the prior art, excluding those which are known or 
obvious in light of the prior art.” Id. at 1182–85. 
206 See Lefstin, supra note 29. 
207 See id. at 1168. 
208 See id. at 1217. 
209 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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Lilly, it was widely believed that originally-filed patent claims adequately 
described their own subject matter, so that the written description requirement 
served solely to prohibit the later claiming of new matter added during 
prosecution.210 In Lilly, however, the Federal Circuit held invalid an originally filed 
claim directed to a microorganism modified to contain human insulin-encoding 
cDNA.211 The specification disclosed “a process for obtaining human insulin-
encoding cDNA” and “the amino acid sequence of the human insulin A and B 
chains,” but gave “no further information . . . pertaining to that cDNA’s relevant 
structural or physical characteristics.”212 The court found that the disclosure did not 
provide a written description of the cDNA, and went on to explain what an 
adequate description would “usually” entail: 
[A] cDNA is not defined or described by the mere name “cDNA,” even if 
accompanied by the name of the protein that it encodes, but requires a kind of 
specificity usually achieved by means of the recitation of the sequence of 
nucleotides that make up the cDNA. A description of a genus of cDNAs may be 
achieved by means of a recitation of a representative number of cDNAs, defined 
by nucleotide sequence, falling within the scope of the genus or of a recitation of 
structural features common to the members of the genus, which features 
constitute a substantial portion of the genus.213 
Departing from the majority of Lilly’s commentators who “have focused on 
the Federal Circuit’s demand for structure or sequence information,”214 Lefstin 
                                                          
 
210 See Christopher M. Holman, Is Lilly Written Description a Paper Tiger? A Comprehensive 
Assessment of the Impact of Eli Lilly and Its Progeny in the Courts and PTO, 17 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 
1, 6 (2007); but see Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1200–02 (citing WILLIAM C. ROBINSON, THE LAW OF 
PATENTS FOR USEFUL INVENTIONS § 484 (1890)) (noting that Robinson’s “monumental and influential 
1890 treatise” recognized a written description requirement separate from the enablement requirement 
for original claims); Zhibin Ren, Note, Confusing Reasoning, Right Result: The Written Description 
Requirement and Regents of the University of California v. Eli Lilly & Company, 1999 WIS. L. REV. 
1297, 1312 (1999) (“Although prior to Lilly the written description requirement had been used 
exclusively to prevent later-claims from obtaining an earlier priority date, the court never expressly 
closed the door on applying the written description requirement to originally filed claims.”). 
211 Eli Lilly, 119 F.3d at 1567. 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 1568–69 (citation omitted). 
214 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1205 (citing Holman, supra note 210, at 19 n.89 (collecting structural 
criticisms)); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Biotechnology’s Uncertainty Principle, 54 CASE W. RES. 
L. REV. 691, 697–98 (2004)). 
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interprets the court’s language as a call for definitional information about the 
claimed genus.215 He notes that the two descriptive approaches suggested by the 
court “correspond perfectly to the two modes of definition” presented in Peter 
Coffey’s classic text The Science of Logic;216 i.e., definition by intension and 
definition by type.217 Definition by intension involves “specifying the proximate 
genus to which it belongs, and those properties which differentiate it from other 
members of the genus.”218 As Coffey writes, differentiating properties “are 
intended as much to be diagnostic—i.e., features by which a species may be 
identified—as to declare the essential nature of the species.”219 Definition by type 
“proceeds by designating some individual or group of individuals as central or 
typical members of the genus and determining membership in the genus by degree 
of resemblance.”220 According to Coffey, the “perfect” definition by type of a class 
of things consists of an “exemplification” of the class by a smaller group of 
individuals221 such that “the class exemplified does possess in common those 
attributes, those only, possessed in common by the smaller group.”222 
Lefstin argues that by requiring a claimed genus to be defined by one of these 
approaches, Lilly’s written description requirement “anchor[s] claim scope within 
the hierarchy of definitional genera.”223 For example, Lilly itself is concerned with 
locating claims amidst a hierarchy of successfully narrower genera consisting of 
“DNA,” “vertebrate DNA,” “vertebrate insulin DNA,” “mammalian insulin DNA,” 
“rat insulin DNA,” and some “particular variant of rat insulin DNA.”224 According 
to Lefstin, an inventor who discovers and discloses only rat insulin DNA may 
claim “rat insulin DNA” but not “vertebrate insulin DNA,” because the inventor’s 
disclosure defines the broader genus “neither by properties that distinguish it from 
                                                          
 
215 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1205. 
216 P. COFFEY, THE SCIENCE OF LOGIC (1912). 
217 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1205. 
218 See id. at 1205–06 & n.200 (citing COFFEY, supra note 216, at 94). 
219 COFFEY, supra note 216, at 94. 
220 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1206 & n.201 (citing COFFEY, supra note 216, at 98). 
221 See COFFEY, supra note 216, at 94. 
222 See id. at 103 n.1. 
223 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1212. 
224 See id. at 1211. 
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other genera, nor by a set of types by which the genus can be recognized by 
degrees of resemblance.”225 Thus conceived as an “anchor[]” of claim scope, the 
written description requirement performs at least two needed functions: “more 
precisely defin[ing] the boundaries of the patent,”226 and providing a way for “the 
disclosure of the invention [to] become a more significant source of definitional 
information” in keeping with its increasingly vital role in claim construction.227 
In the course of proposing his definitional account of the written description 
requirement, Lefstin rejects the Federal Circuit’s explanation of the requirement as 
a rule that the applicant must demonstrate “possession of the invention” as of the 
filing date.228 Lefstin essentially accuses the court of a category error,229 reasoning 
that “[i]t is not syntactically sensible to ask whether an inventor ‘invented’ or 
‘possessed’ an abstract bundle of properties defining a legally cognizable right.”230 
As I argue below,231 however, the Federal Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence, 
which the court pointedly reaffirmed in Ariad Pharmaceuticals (2010),232 is neither 
metaphysically erroneous nor incompatible with Lefstin’s definitional account. I 
am inclined to accept that the written description requirement serves both 
functions. 
I find Lefstin’s other arguments convincing and his ontological perspectives 
on claim scope insightful, though ultimately incomplete. Lefstin persuasively 
demonstrates that the enablement requirement cannot alone define the scope of 
patent claims, and that the written description requirement serves in part to provide 
this definitional function. But Lefstin does not explore how the patent system 
confers ontological status upon inventions and embodiments under the doctrine of 
constructive reduction to practice. The issue of ontological commitment does not 
arise in Lefstin’s analysis, because nothing in his incomplete account of patent 
                                                          
 
225 See id. 
226 See id. at 1219. 
227 See id. at 1220–21. 
228 See id. at 1197–1200 (citing Vas-Kath v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
229 See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47, at 123 (defining “category 
mistake” as “the placing of an entity in the wrong category” or “the attribution to an entity of a property 
which that entity cannot have”). 
230 Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1199. 
231 See infra Part III.C.2. 
232 Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc). 
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doctrine entails that claims and embodiments have any particular status in the 
patent system’s ontology. 
Lefstin is careful in his ontological description of patent claims, as far as he 
goes. He notes that many of patent law’s doctrines, including infringement, 
anticipation, nonobviousness and utility, can be described using the set-theoretic 
concepts of intersection and containment,233 but finds that the enablement standard 
cannot be so characterized, because the nature of the patent claim “makes patent 
law not reducible to a simple set-theoretic system.”234 He accurately concludes that 
the “ontological nature of patent claims” is that they are classes having infinite 
scope.235 But Lefstin’s analysis does not entail that the patent system be 
ontologically committed to the existence of claims as either set-entities or class-
entities. The intersection and containment relationships he employs can be 
adequately expressed without ontological commitment to sets or classes, by 
characterizing claims as mereological sums or fusions of their embodiments (and 
embodiments as parts of claims).236 For example, without using set-intersection 
language, we can simply say that making a collection of things y infringes claim x 
if there is an embodiment z that is both a part of x and a part of y; in other words, 
there is an overlap between x and y,237 or x shares parts with y.238 On this reading, 
an adequate written description performs its definitional function by picking out the 
embodiments whose fusion is the claim, thereby determining the claim’s (infinite) 
                                                          
 
233 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1161–64. 
234 See id. at 1167. 
235 See id. at 1168. 
236 See ROUTLEDGE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY 318 (Edward Craig ed., 1998) (defining mereology 
as “the theory of the part-whole relation” that “tak[es] the part-whole relation as primitive”); ROBERT 
CASATI & ACHILLE C. VARZI, PARTS AND PLACES: THE STRUCTURES OF SPATIAL REPRESENTATION 11 
(1999) (“Mereologically, for every whole there is a set of parts, and to every set of parts (that is, every 
arbitrary collection of objects) there may in principle correspond a complete whole, viz. their 
mereological sum or fusion.”). 
This is not to say that patent claims can accurately be characterized as mereological sums or 
fusions of their embodiments, as such a characterization incorrectly ties claim scope to the embodiments 
that make up the claim. See supra text accompanying note 44 (“[T]he number of existing patent claim 
embodiments has no effect on the claim’s scope.”). There is nothing in Lefstin’s incomplete account of 
patent doctrine, however, that is inconsistent with a mereological account of claims and embodiments. 
237 See CASATI & VARZI, supra note 236, at 36. 
238 See id. at 33; cf. supra note 203 (describing Lefstin’s set-theoretic description of infringement 
doctrine). 
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scope.239 Such a mereological account need not be taken to entail any ontological 
commitment to claims beyond that already provided to their embodiments.240 
Lefstin’s account of patent doctrine is sufficient, and indeed well suited, to 
support his central thesis that the written description requirement has a necessary 
function in limiting claim scope; however, it misses the adequate disclosure 
requirements’ more fundamental roles in connection with incurring and warranting 
ontological commitments to claims and embodiments. In the two sections that 
follow, I will explain how these roles not only subsume both the definitional and 
“possession” conceptions of the written description requirement, but also critically 
illuminate the patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts.” 
B. Ontological Commitments in Patent Discourse 
In the metaphysics literature, a theorist is said to incur an ontological 
commitment if she is committed to acknowledging an entity’s existence in virtue of 
her acceptance of the truth of a given theory.241 The theorist’s warrant for this 
commitment is the set of facts she takes to justify such an assertion of the entity’s 
existence.242 
                                                          
 
239 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1211 (“Once we recognize written description as a method of logical 
definition, then its function in determining claim scope becomes clear.”). 
240 See DAVID LEWIS, PARTS OF CLASSES 81 (1991) (describing mereology as “ontologically innocent”). 
Lewis gives the following example: 
Given a prior commitment to cats, say, a commitment to cat-fusions is not a 
further commitment. The fusion is nothing over and above the cats that 
compose it. It just is them. They just are it. Take them together or take them 
separately, the cats are the same portion of Reality either way. 
Id.; see also 2 D.M. ARMSTRONG, A THEORY OF UNIVERSALS: UNIVERSALS AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM 
36–38 (1978); Donald L.M. Baxter, Identity in the Loose and Popular Sense, 97 MIND 575 (1988). 
Lewis’s view on this matter is not undisputed. See, e.g., Peter Forrest, How Innocent Is Mereology?, 56 
ANALYSIS 127 (1996) (arguing against mereological innocence); Verity Harte, Plato’s Problem of 
Composition, in PROC. BOSTON AREA COLLOQUIUM IN ANCIENT PHILOSOPHY v. 17, at 5–6 (John J. 
Cleary & Gary M. Gurtler eds. 2001) (same); Byeong-uk Yi, Is Mereology Ontologically Innocent?, 93 
PHIL. STUDIES 141 (1999) (same). The point here, however, is that Lefstin’s logic is valid even on a 
mereological reading, so it was not necessary for Lefstin’s analysis to explore the issue of ontological 
commitment for it to be complete on its own terms. 
241 See E.J. LOWE, A SURVEY OF METAPHYSICS 215 (2002) (defining criterion of ontological 
commitment as “a principle which will reliably tell us what kinds of entities a theorist is committed to 
acknowledging as existent, in virtue of his acceptance of the truth of a given theory . . . .”). 
242 Such warrants are often implicit. See Alexander Bird, Laws and Criteria, 32 CAN. J. PHIL. 511, 515–
16 (2002) (explaining that for a thinker who is not “consciously or reflectively aware” of her 
propositional attitudes, “[w]hat facts she ‘takes to warrant’ what other facts will be shown in the 
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An ontological commitment may be de dicto or de re. A de dicto commitment 
is to be understood as a proposition about a state of affairs, while a de re 
commitment is understood to refer to a specific entity.243 As Michael Jubien 
explains, a de dicto commitment to a particular holds that the truth of a theory 
implies the existence of some unique entity, but does not per se restrict the identity 
of this entity to a “particular particular.”244 For example, the truth of a theorem that 
“there is a unique president at a given moment in 1972” incurs a commitment to the 
existence of exactly one president at that moment in time, but does not by its terms 
incur a commitment to the existence of Richard Nixon at that time.245 In contrast, a 
de re commitment to a particular implies the existence of a specific entity. A 
theorem stating that “there is an x such that x=c,” where c is a constant interpreted 
as referring to Richard Nixon, would incur such a commitment.246 
Analogously, a de dicto commitment to a kind takes the form “The theory is 
committed to the existence of (possible) objects of a given kind,” in contrast to a de 
re commitment, which essentially states “There are certain (possible) objects of a 
given kind to which the theory is committed.”247 As Jubien notes, a de re 
commitment to a kind is equivalent to a de re commitment to certain particulars of 
the kind.248 
The decisions and actions of legal institutions, including the Patent Office and 
the courts, are premised on facts and theories that such institutions take to be true in 
law, whether or not known to be true in fact.249 Accordingly, the patent system may 
be said to incur ontological commitments to claims and embodiments whenever it 
                                                                                                                                      
 
inferences she is disposed to make, what beliefs she forms given certain information and so forth, and 
need not be manifested by assertions equivalent to ‘I take p to provide me with warrant for asserting 
q.’”). 
243 See Justin Broakes, Belief De Re and De Dicto, 36 PHIL. Q. 374, 374 (1986) (“Belief de dicto is 
belief that a certain dictum (or proposition) is true, whereas belief de re is belief about a particular res 
(or thing) that it has a certain property.”). 
244 See Michael Jubien, Ontological Commitment to Particulars, 28 SYNTHESE 513, 513 (1974). 
245 See id. 
246 See id. 
247 See Michael Jubien, Ontological Commitment to Kinds, 31 SYNTHESE 85, 86 (1975). 
248 See id. 
249 See Harold J. Berman & Charles J. Reid, Jr., The Transformation of English Legal Science: From 
Hale to Blackstone, 45 EMORY L.J. 437, 458 (1996) (“Like a literary work of fiction, a legal fiction is 
not meant to be taken as true in fact. It is, however, true in another sense—it is true in law.”). 
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engages in legally operative discourse predicated on the existence of such entities. 
Such discourse reveals the patent system’s criteria of ontological commitment. A 
criterion of ontological commitment is “a principle for determining just what 
objects or entities a theory says there are (or what entities must exist in order for a 
theory to be true).”250 The warrants for the patent system’s ontological 
commitments are the facts taken by the patent system to be legally sufficient to 
justify its decisions and actions arising from the discourse in question. By this 
account, the patent system appears to incur ontological commitments to patent 
claims and embodiments in at least three situations. 
First, under the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice, the disclosure 
of an invention in a filed patent application is given the same legal effect as a 
finding that the patent specification is a true description of existing kinds of entities 
with essential causal properties; i.e., the claim exists as a kind whose examples 
include (possible) embodiments,251 and any specifically disclosed embodiments 
exist as particulars.252 The patent system thereby incurs a de dicto ontological 
commitment to the claim as a kind,253 de re ontological commitments to any 
specifically disclosed actual embodiments as particulars, and de dicto ontological 
commitments to any specifically disclosed prophetic embodiments as particulars.254 
                                                          
 
250 CYNTHIA MACDONALD, VARIETIES OF THINGS: FOUNDATIONS OF CONTEMPORARY METAPHYSICS 25 
(2005). 
251 See, e.g., Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (“The 
patent law authorizes that an invention may be constructively reduced to practice by filing a patent 
application, whether the embodiments were actually made or are constructed in the patent application.”). 
252 A priority determination in the interference context may be predicated on the constructive reduction 
to practice of a specifically disclosed embodiment. See, e.g., Hunt v. Treppschuh, 523 F.2d 1386, 1387 
(C.C.P.A. 1975) (explaining that support of a count requires “disclosure of an embodiment within the 
count that meets the requirements of the first paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112.”). 
253 See supra note 128 (explaining that support for a claim need not include support for actual 
embodiments); cf. Jubien, supra note 247, at 88–89 (for a kind that is a natural kind or species, 
suggesting approach of using “a species-term” to refer to “the (possible) species it would correctly pick 
out if the relevant parts of the story were true reports of the accurate observations of a naturalist (if such 
a species exists).”). 
254 A prophetic (or paper) example “describe[s] the manner and process of making an embodiment of the 
invention which has not actually been conducted.” MPEP, supra note 191, at § 608.01(p). Under the 
doctrine of constructive reduction to practice, a prophetic example is given same the same legal effect as 
a finding of the existence of a specific embodiment enabled by the example, even though no particular 
embodiment of that sort can be identified. See Hoffman-LaRoche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 
1354, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (Newman, J., dissenting) (“To fulfill their legal purpose, [prophetic] 
examples must be enabling of specific embodiments. . . . The patent law authorizes that an invention 
may be constructively reduced to practice by filing a patent application, whether the embodiments were 
actually made or are constructed in the patent application.”). 
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Each of these commitments is warranted by the adequacy of the filed disclosure 
under the first paragraph of § 112 with respect to the claim or embodiment in 
question.255 
Second, when a claim is found anticipated by use256 or prior reduction to 
practice under § 102(a),257 or barred by public use or on-sale activity under 
§ 102(b),258 it is because the patent system has affirmed the existence of a specific 
embodiment of the claim prior to the invention or the critical date (or its 
constructive equivalent, either in another inventor’s patent application259 or in the 
commercial offer for sale of an invention at the “ready for patenting” stage260). The 
patent system incurs a de re ontological commitment to the prior art embodiment 
referred to in the evidentiary finding (as in “x was in public use more than a year 
before the filing date”), which is warranted by clear and convincing evidence of 
direct experience of a particular that is an example of the claim.261 
                                                          
 
255 See 3A CHISUM ON PATENTS § 10.05[5], at 10-162 (“In order to constitute constructive reduction to 
practice as of its filing date, the application must comply with the requirements of the first paragraph of 
Section 112.”). 
256 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) (denying patentability where the claimed “invention was . . . used by others in 
this country . . . before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent . . . .”). 
257 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (denying patentability if the claimed invention was made earlier by the 
other party in an interference, or made earlier in the United States by another inventor, and not 
abandoned, suppressed or concealed). An applicant who is first to reduce to practice may also lose 
priority to another inventor who is first to conceive and diligent in reducing to practice. See id. In such a 
case, no ontological commitment to a prior embodiment of the claim is incurred. 
258 See 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (denying patentability where the claimed “invention was . . . in public use or 
on sale in this country, more than one year prior to the date of the application for patent in the United 
States . . . .”). 
259 See Frazer v. Schlegel, 498 F.3d 1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citations omitted) (“When interference 
priority is at issue, constructive reduction to practice of a count may be established by disclosure of an 
embodiment within the count.”). 
260 See Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 U.S. 55, 67–68 (1998); see also Timothy R. Holbrook, The More 
Things Change, The More They Stay the Same: Implications of Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc. and the 
Quest for Predictability in the On-Sale Bar, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 933, 952–55 (2000) (relating 
Pfaff’s “ready for patenting” standard to the doctrine of constructive reduction to practice). 
261 See Orion IP, LLC v. Hyundai Motor America, 605 F.3d 967, 975 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (citation omitted) 
(“[T]he party asserting invalidity due to anticipation must prove anticipation, a question of fact, by clear 
and convincing evidence.”); Netscape Commc’ns Corp. v. Konrad, 295 F.3d 1315, 1320 (Fed. Cir. 
2002) (citation omitted) (“A conclusion that a section 102(b) bar invalidates a patent must be based on 
clear and convincing evidence.”). 
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Finally, when a claim is found infringed under § 271(a), it is because the 
patent system has affirmed the existence of a specific embodiment of the claim that 
was made, used, offered for sale, sold or imported by the defendant.262 The patent 
system incurs a de re ontological commitment to the infringing embodiment, which 
is warranted by the preponderance of evidence of past or present direct experience 
of a particular that is an example of the claim. 
If the above inventory is basically correct, then the patent system’s 
ontological commitments to claims and embodiments are grounded in either (1) 
adequate disclosure in a filed patent application or (2) a proven report of past or 
present direct experience. Moreover, given that proven reports of direct experience 
would be acceptable ontological warrants even in a minimal legal epistemology,263 
it is patent law’s doctrines of adequate disclosure that determine the overall extent 
of the patent system’s ontological commitments to claims and embodiments. 
It is costly for the patent system to incur ontological commitments to claims 
and embodiments.264 The filing of a claim in a patent application is a demand that 
                                                          
 
262 Cf. Transocean Offshore Deepwater Drilling, Inc. v. Maersk Contractors, 617 F.3d 1296, 1310–11 
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (concluding that schematics accompanying a sales contract could support a finding of 
infringement even when the product had not yet been built and the accused infringer retained the right to 
alter the design to make it non-infringing); Waymark Corp. v. Porta Sys. Corp., 245 F.3d 1364, 1368 
(Fed. Cir. 2001) (noting that “infringement without a completed infringing embodiment is not the norm 
in patent law” but is contemplated by statutory provisions beyond the scope of § 271(a)). 
263 See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 602 advisory committee’s note (citation omitted) (“‘[T]he rule requiring that 
a witness who testifies to a fact which can be perceived by the senses must have had an opportunity to 
observe, and must have actually observed the fact’ is a ‘most pervasive manifestation’ of the common 
law insistence upon ‘the most reliable sources of information.’”); Joseph Boyle, Free Choice, 
Incommensurable Goods and the Self-Refutation of Determinism, 50 AM. J. JURIS. 139, 157 (2005) (“[I]t 
may be possible to stand back epistemologically from one’s assent, but seeing an event, or remembering 
a recent event, you just believe the proposition describing it, and reasonably so. There seems to be no 
choice in the matter.”). 
Of course, the patent system does not accept all reports of direct experience as proof of existence. 
See, e.g., Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (rejecting 
“uncorroborated oral testimony . . . of interested persons recalling long-past events” regarding prior use 
of patented method). In admitting reports of direct experience as evidence of existence, however, the 
patent system rejects a posture of universal skepticism toward sensory experience and memory, such as 
that expressed in René Descartes’s Meditations on First Philosophy. Compare FED. R. EVID. 602 
(“Evidence to prove personal knowledge may . . . consist of the witness’ own testimony.”), with RENÉ 
DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 51 (Donald A. Cress ed., 1996) (“[E]verything I ever 
thought I sensed while awake I could believe I also sometimes sensed while asleep”). 
264 See generally JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. MEURER, PATENT FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, 
BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 38–45 (2008) (describing costs of defining 
new property rights). 
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the patent system not only admit a new kind into its ontology of “useful Arts,” but 
regulate the creation, use and sale of all entities within its jurisdiction that are 
examples of the kind.265 As I will now argue, patent law’s written description 
doctrine serves in part to provide limiting criteria for the patent system’s 
ontological commitments to claims. 
C. Written Description as a Doctrine of Ontological Possession 
A comprehensive analysis of the patent system’s criteria of ontological 
commitment to claims as kinds is beyond the scope of this Article.266 It is sufficient 
here to argue as a more general matter that any kind that is the subject of 
ontological commitment must pick out a definite (possibly empty) class of 
examples. As philosopher Michael Jubien describes this proposition,267 this is “a 
very modest and natural assumption about kinds—one that I think would be met by 
any plausible philosophical doctrine on the nature of kinds.”268 Jubien himself 
relies on this assumption in formulating a criterion of de dicto ontological 
commitment to kinds269 suitable for theories in which kinds may stand in 
definitional hierarchies.270 
By this account, the patent system’s criteria of ontological commitment 
subsume Lefstin’s definitional account of the written description requirement. 
According to Lefstin, the standard for the written description’s definitional function 
is to be found in the Federal Circuit’s Lilly decision, which characterizes “a fully 
described genus” as one that allows “one skilled in the art . . . [to] visualize or 
                                                          
 
265 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a) (granting the patentee “the right to exclude others from making, using, 
offering for sale, or selling the invention throughout the United States or importing the invention into 
the United States” during the patent term). 
266 Cf. Jubien, supra note 247, at 85 (noting that his explanation of ontological commitment to kinds is 
“not self-contained,” but relies on “technical notions introduced” in a previous article). 
267 See id. (stating the assumption more formally as “for any kind κ , there exists in every world a 
definite (possibly empty) class of objects of that kind” and denoting the class of objects of kind κ  in 
world H by { }Hxx κ| ). 
268Id. 
269 More formally, Jubien states the criterion as follows: IT ,  is committed to objects of kind κ  if for 
every )(HIu -model M, { } Ø|)( ≠∩ HxxMD κ  for every H in which uu IT ,  is true. See id. at 87. 
270 See id. at 86 (“The criterion we seek should satisfy the condition that if a theory is committed to 
objects of kind κ , and if objects of kind κ  are necessarily also of kind κ′ , then the theory is 
committed to objects of kind κ′  as well.”). 
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recognize the identity of the members of the genus.”271 A claim that is “fully 
described” according to this standard is one that can be the subject of ontological 
commitment, as one skilled in the art can recognize (and therefore pick out) the 
embodiments of the claim, which form a definite class of examples. 
This reinterpretation of Lefstin’s account also plausibly explains the Federal 
Circuit’s characterization of the written description requirement as an obligation 
that the applicant show “that, as of the filing date sought, he or she was in 
possession of the invention.”272 To Lefstin, the Federal Circuit’s “possession” 
jurisprudence makes no sense, because “‘the invention’ is a bundle of properties 
recited by the claims, defining the perimeter of the patentee’s legal right to 
exclude”: it may be meaningful to ask whether an inventor possessed certain “ideas 
and things,” but not “abstract legal entities or infinite sets of subject matter.”273 
Since Lilly, however, the court has continued to frame the written description 
requirement as a possession inquiry,274 including in its recent en banc decision in 
Ariad.275 
In the written description case law leading up to Ariad, Lefstin sees a missed 
opportunity to follow Lilly’s lead in clarifying that the “true role of the written 
description doctrine” was in requiring definitional information rather than a 
showing of possession.276 But Lilly need not be read as a departure from the 
Federal Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence. In Lilly, the court refers to its opinion 
four months earlier in Lockwood v. American Airlines277 for what it takes to be the 
                                                          
 
271 Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1206 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 
1568 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
272 See, e.g., Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. Cir. 1991). For other 
commentary challenging this characterization, see, for example, Mark D. Janis, On Courts Herding 
Cats: Contending with the “Written Description” Requirement (and Other Unruly Patent Disclosure 
Doctrines, 2 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 55, 62 (2000) (arguing that the written description requirement is 
“an essentially standardless disclosure doctrine that can be deployed arbitrarily”); Timothy R. Holbrook, 
Possession in Patent Law, 59 SMU L. REV. 123, 161–63 (2006) (arguing that the written description 
requirement should not be used to ensure possession, as that function is better performed by the 
enablement requirement). 
273 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1199. 
274 See id. at 1210 & n.220 (citing cases). 
275 See Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (en banc) (“[T]he test 
for sufficiency is whether the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those 
skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject matter as of the filing date.”). 
276 See Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1207–10. 
277 Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
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definitive statement of the written description requirement: “To fulfill the written 
description requirement, a patent specification must describe an invention and do 
so in sufficient detail that one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that ‘the 
inventor invented the claimed invention.’”278 The Lockwood court, in turn, finds 
that it is “accurate[]” to say that the requirement is met by a “show[ing] that one is 
‘in possession’ of the invention,”279 and goes on to explain what such a showing 
entails: 
One shows that one is “in possession” of the invention by describing the 
invention, with all its claimed limitations, not that which makes it obvious. 
(“[T]he applicant must also convey to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing 
date sought, he or she was in possession of the invention. The invention is, for 
purposes of the ‘written description’ inquiry, whatever is now claimed.”) One 
does that by such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams, 
formulas, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention.280 
The effect of this explanation is to read into the language preceding the patent 
claims (e.g., “I claim”281) a further predicate of the form “I am now in possession 
of.” Under a standard interpretation, the speaker of such a predicate (i.e., the patent 
applicant) incurs an ontological commitment to each entity that is an object of the 
predicate: one can possess only what exists. By our account above, the written 
description requirement serves to ensure that the claims are kinds that pick out 
well-defined classes,282 as is necessary to satisfy the patent system’s criteria of 
ontological commitment. 
On this interpretation, to “possess” a claimed invention is to possess the claim 
as a kind in one’s ontology, having incurred a de dicto283 ontological commitment 
                                                          
 
278 Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing 
Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572). 
279 See Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572 (citing Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563–64 (Fed. 
Cir. 1991) (“Lockwood argues that all that is necessary to satisfy the description requirement is to show 
that one is ‘in possession’ of the invention. Lockwood accurately states the test. . . .”). 
280 Id. (citation omitted). 
281 See supra text accompanying note 71. 
282 See supra text accompanying note 271. 
283 In this case, the entities are kinds to which the patent system incurs only a de dicto and not a de re 
ontological commitment. See supra text accompanying note 253. Since the language of the patent 
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to the claim according to the patent system’s criteria for such commitment. The 
filing of a patent application that meets the written description requirement serves 
to “convey” this ontological commitment “to those skilled in the art” who read the 
application, insofar as a reader’s acceptance of the truth of the patent specification 
(including the applicant’s representations of possession) implies the existence of 
the claims as kinds whose examples include (possible) working embodiments. 
Whatever the inventor’s criteria of ontological commitment may be, the 
written description requirement ensures that the patent disclosure convey 
ontological commitment to a reader according to the patent system’s criteria for 
such commitment. Every such reader is entitled to “possess” the invention in this 
ontological sense.284 By demonstrating ontological possession of the claimed and 
described invention at the time of filing, however, the inventor is uniquely entitled 
to establish priority for the filed claims. The written description requirement’s role 
in securing ontological commitment thus also subsumes the requirement’s 
traditional role in policing against the addition of new matter.285 Upon securing 
priority in this way and meeting the other requirements for patentability, the 
inventor is awarded an entitlement to regulate the ontological possession of future 
de re commitments to the claim and its embodiments; i.e., by excluding others from 
bringing into existence any embodiments that might be the subject of such 
commitments. On this reading, then, the patent right does not include an exclusive 
right to “possess” the claimed invention, but does include the most important of the 
“sticks” in the property rights “bundle”: the right to exclude others.286 
                                                                                                                                      
 
application need convey no more than a de dicto commitment to these kinds, the applicant need incur 
only a de dicto commitment in making the application. 
284 Cf. In re Borst, 345 F.2d 851, 855 (C.C.P.A. 1965) (holding that for the teachings of a prior art patent 
to anticipate a claimed invention, “the [prior art] disclosure must be such as will give possession of the 
invention to the person of ordinary skill.”). Since such ontological possession includes knowledge of 
claim scope, this account also recognizes the notice function of the written description requirement. Cf. 
Lefstin, supra note 29, at 1219 (arguing that by demanding definitional information, the written 
description requirement improves notice of patent scope). 
285 See, e.g., In re Curtis, 354 F.3d 1347, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (explaining that later-filed claims can 
claim the priority date of an earlier application only if the earlier application’s disclosure “reasonably 
convey[s] to one of ordinary skill in the art that the inventors possessed the later-claimed subject matter 
when they filed the earlier application.”). 
286 Cf. College Sav. Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 673 
(1999) (citation omitted) (“The hallmark of a protected property interest is the right to exclude others. 
That is ‘one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as 
property.’”); Aleksandar Nikolic, Securitization of Patents and Its Continued Viability in Light of the 
Current Economic Conditions, 19 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 393, 395–96 (2009) (“While a patent is 
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In summary, I have provided an ontological account of the written description 
requirement that both incorporates Lefstin’s definitional account and supports the 
Federal Circuit’s “possession” jurisprudence. In this account, the written 
description requirement serves to ensure that one who reads the applicant’s claims 
in light of the specification thereby incurs de dicto ontological commitments to 
those claims according to the patent system’s criteria for such commitments. I will 
now turn to an account of the enablement requirement as providing the 
complementary function of ensuring that any ontological commitments so incurred 
are warranted according to the patent system’s epistemology. 
IV. THE ONTOLOGICAL ROLE OF THE ENABLEMENT 
REQUIREMENT 
To complete our account of the patent system’s ontological commitments, it 
remains to show how the enablement requirement secures warrants to de dicto 
ontological commitments to claims as kinds; i.e., how an enabling disclosure serves 
to justify (according to the patent system’s epistemology) the belief that entities of 
the claimed kind, having certain essential causal properties, may exist in this world. 
To understand what an enabling disclosure needs to do to fulfill this justificatory 
role, it is necessary first to examine the epistemological burdens such a belief 
places on the patent system. In particular, the enforceability of a patent claim 
requires that the patent system have available sufficient epistemological machinery 
to make factual determinations as to whether a given accused entity exists and is of 
the claimed kind. 
These determinations may involve extensive appeals to scientific realism, as 
Centricut v. Esab Group287 illustrates. In that case, Esab Group (“Esab”) asserted 
two patent claims directed to an improved electrode for a plasma arc torch.288 
Centricut sought a declaratory judgment of invalidity and noninfringement against 
Esab, and Esab filed infringement counterclaims.289 After a bench trial,290 the 
district court held one of Esab’s claims infringed.291 The Federal Circuit reversed 
                                                                                                                                      
 
considered property, an owner is not granted the full ‘bundle of sticks’ of property rights in an invention 
but merely ‘the [negative] right to exclude others.’”). 
287 Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
288 See id. at 1363. 
289 See id. 
290 See id. at 1365. 
291 See id. at 1366–67. 
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the trial court’s finding of infringement, relying heavily on the testimony of 
Centricut’s expert that Esab had not conducted testing sufficient to show that the 
accused electrode fell within the scope of the claim.292 In giving weight to this 
expert testimony, the appeals court discounted the rebuttal testimony of Esab’s 
inventor and other witnesses, none of whom were qualified as experts.293 
The Federal Circuit based its decision on the following facts. Plasma arc 
torches use electrical arcs—essentially, artificial lightning bolts294—to superheat a 
stream of gas to a plasma state at temperatures of around 30,000 degrees Kelvin, 
hot enough to cut metal.295 Torches that use oxygen gas are particularly suitable for 
cutting carbon steel.296 Most conventional torch electrodes consist of a metal 
emissive insert embedded in a holder made of a different metal.297 
According to Esab’s patent disclosure, the emissive insert is composed of a 
metal that has a low “work function”; i.e., the amount of energy required to 
“permit[] thermionic emission of [an electron from] a metal at a given 
temperature.”298 This low work function makes the insert “capable of readily 
emitting electrons when an electric potential is applied thereto,” so that in the 
torch’s normal operation the arc is supported by the insert.299 In conventional 
torches, however, the use of oxygen gas can cause the metal holder to oxidize.300 If 
the holder is made of a metal such as copper whose work function falls when it is 
oxidized, the arc may begin to emanate from the holder in preference to the insert, 
causing the holder to melt and the electrode to fail.301 Esab’s invention provides a 
sleeve positioned between the insert and the holder that has a high work function 
                                                          
 
292 See id. at 1367–68. 
293 See id. at 1368–69. 
294 See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT IN HEALTHCARE FACILITIES 34 (Kathryn D. Wagner ed., 
1998) (“Plasma Arc reactors generate intense heat . . . through discharge of a powerful electrical arc 
(artificial lightning).”). 
295 See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1363. 
296 See id. 
297 See id. 
298 U.S. Patent No. 5,023,425 col.1 (filed Mar. 6, 1990). 
299 Id. 
300 See id. 
301 See id. 
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relative to the emissive insert.302 The addition of the sleeve keeps the arc on the 
emissive insert even when the holder becomes oxidized, thereby prolonging the 
electrode’s life.303 
Claim 1, the broader of Esab’s claims recited, inter alia, “an emissive insert 
composed of a metallic material having a relatively low work function, and a sleeve 
surrounding said emissive insert . . . composed of a metallic material having a work 
function which is greater than that of the material of said emissive insert.”304 Esab’s 
other claim, claim 8, further specified, inter alia, that the sleeve’s work function 
was greater than that of the holder and that the insert’s “relatively low work 
function” adapted it “to readily emit electrons upon an electric potential being 
applied thereto.”305 
In the district court, Centricut moved for summary judgment of invalidity for 
indefiniteness, arguing that the work function of a metallic material is dependent on 
too many variables (e.g., surface treatment and crystalline structure) for one of skill 
in the art to determine whether either claim read on a particular combination of 
holder, sleeve and insert materials.306 The court rejected this argument, finding the 
claims’ work function limitation to be definite: 
It may well be, as Centricut claims, that some silver sleeves could be within the 
claims while others silver sleeves fall outside the claims, depending upon the 
physical characteristics of the particular sample of silver used and the identity of 
the metal used for the emissive insert, but that is not due to any indefiniteness in 
the claim. Rather, it is due to the nature of work function as an electro-chemical 
characteristic that is dependent upon a variety of variables . . . . [A]ll one must 
do to make a silver [sleeve] that avoids the work-function limitation . . . is to use 
silver with the necessary physical characteristics (surface treatment, crystalline 
structure, etc.) to give it a work function equal to or lower than the work 
function of the material selected for the emissive insert . . . .307 
                                                          
 
302 See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1363–64. 
303 See id. at 1364. 
304 Id. 
305 Id. at 1364 n.1. 
306 Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., No. 99-039-M, 2002 WL 220057, at *4 (D.N.H. Feb. 7, 2002). 
307 Id. at *5. 
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In Centricut’s accused electrode, the holder was made of copper, the sleeve 
was made of silver, and the insert was made of hafnium.308 At trial, Centricut’s 
expert had submitted tables providing work function values for various element 
samples, including one that reported values ranging from 3.08 to 4.81 electron-
volts for silver and a single value of 3.53 electron-volts for hafnium.309 The district 
court inferred from these tables that “silver commonly has a higher work function 
than halfnium [sic].”310 Noting that “[n]othing in the record suggests that Centricut 
made its silver sleeves from one of the relatively few low-work-function forms of 
silver,” the court concluded that it was more likely than not that Centricut’s 
electrode infringed claim 1.311 In contrast, the court found “too great an overlap in 
relative work-function values for silver and copper to give rise to a reliable 
inference” as to whether the electrode infringed claim 8.312 
Centricut did not appeal the district court’s ruling on indefiniteness,313 but 
raised the issue of the variability of work functions again in appealing the district 
court’s judgment of infringement.314 As Centricut noted, there was no evidence in 
the record “of either the actual work-function values or the actual relative work-
function rankings in the accused Centricut electrode.”315 According to Centricut, 
the district court erred in relying on work function tables as evidence of the actual 
values applicable to the accused electrode.316 Such tables “do not show values for 
materials in bulk,” because the work function of each specimen varies according to 
                                                          
 
308 See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1366; Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., No. 99-CV-39, 2003 WL 
21558348, at *2 (D.N.H. July 9, 2003). 
309 See Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1366 & n.3. 
310 Id. at 1366 (citing Centricut, 2003 WL 21558348, at *3). 
311 Id. 
312 Id. (citing Centricut, 2003 WL 21558348, at *3). 
313 See id. at 1367 n.4. 
314 Brief of Appellants at 7–26, Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (No. 
03-1574). 
315 Id. at 7; see also Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1365 (“[N]either party introduced any evidence of tests 
conducted to directly measure the work function of the materials used in the accused device. Indeed, 
neither party introduced evidence of tests or other evidence concerning the exact materials used in the 
accused device.”). 
316 See Brief of Appellants, supra note 314, at 11. 
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its own surface and atomic arrangements and the conditions under which the 
emission is measured.317 
The Federal Circuit agreed with this argument, crediting the testimony of 
Centricut’s expert to the effect that “work function is not an intrinsic property of a 
metal, but is rather a property of specific surfaces under specific conditions.”318 
The appeals court found that this testimony “directly contradicted” the district 
court’s conclusion that the tables showed that the accused electrode met the work 
function limitation by a preponderance of the evidence.319 The Federal Circuit also 
credited Centricut’s expert testimony that the observed durability of Centricut’s 
accused electrode “could be attributed to a number of different factors, including 
temperature, the geometry of the electrode, the thermal and electrical conductivity 
of the sleeve, or the sleeve’s resistance to oxidation, and that it was not reasonable 
to conclude that longer useful life was attributable to work function.”320 Noting the 
district court’s finding that “the field of technology from which [the invention] 
sprang is so poorly understood that it qualifies as a ‘black art,’” the appeals court 
deemed the case to be one in which expert testimony was necessary to prove 
infringement: 
We do not state a per se rule that expert testimony is required to prove 
infringement when the art is complex. Suffice it to say that in a case involving 
complex technology, where the accused infringer offers expert testimony 
negating infringement, the patentee cannot satisfy its burden of proof by relying 
only on testimony from those who are admittedly not expert in the field.321 
Since Esab had not presented any expert witnesses on the issue of work function, 
the court concluded that Esab had failed to satisfy its burden of proof on 
infringement.322 
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318 Centricut, 390 F.3d at 1365. 
319 See id. at 1367. 
320 Id. at 1368. 
321 Id. at 1370. 
322 See id. 
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Identifying the patent system’s ontological commitments in connection with 
the Centricut case reveals at least three illustrative examples of the patent system’s 
reliance on scientific essentialism and scientific realism. 
First, the issuance of claim 8 required the patent system to incur a de dicto 
ontological commitment to a kind of device with essential causal powers that 
include “readily emit[ting] electrons upon an electric potential being applied 
thereto.”323 While the electron is a paradigmatic unobservable entity,324 “our best 
scientific theories” tell us that thermionic emission is an observable manifestation 
of a real entity of the natural kind known to science as the electron.325 The patent 
system’s commitments to scientific essentialism and to scientific realism serve to 
warrant its acceptance that devices capable of emitting electrons according to claim 
8 can exist.326 
Second, the Patent Office’s issuance of claims 1 and 8 and the district court’s 
judgment of validity entail a finding that well-defined classes of particulars can be 
picked out, each particular having, inter alia, a sleeve characterized by a relatively 
high work function.327 The work function of a material is a causal power, insofar as 
it describes the disposition of the material to engage in a causal process (i.e., 
thermionic emission).328 The patent system’s commitment to scientific essentialism 
                                                          
 
323 See supra text accompanying note 305. 
324 See supra text accompanying notes 183–85. 
325 In a recent book exploring the historicity of scientific realism in the case of the electron, Theodore 
Arabtzis describes the emergence of this scientific consensus: 
Lorentz, Larmor, and even Thomson eventually adopted a single name, 
“electron,” for the theoretical entities they had put forward. Apparently, they 
must have thought that those theoretical entities were representations of the 
same unobservable entity. A prominent reason for their thinking so was that 
the charge-to-mass ratio of ions, electrons, and corpuscles turned out to be 
approximately the same. As a result of the stability of that quantity across 
different experimental contexts, several experimental situations (the Zeeman 
effect, cathode rays, thermionic emission, the photoelectric effect, beta-rays, 
etc.) came to be considered observable manifestations of the same entity, the 
electron. 
ARABATZIS, supra note 184, at 107–08. (citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
326 See supra text accompanying note 182. 
327 See supra text accompanying notes 304–07. 
328 See supra text accompanying note 298. The parties agreed to construe the term “work function” as it 
was defined in Esab’s patent. Centricut, LLC v. Esab Group, Inc., 390 F.3d 1361, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). 
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warrants the district court’s treatment of the sleeve’s work function as an essential 
property of each embodiment of the claims,329 even though work function may vary 
widely among different specimens of the same metallic element and under different 
conditions of use.330 As the court explained in its ruling on indefiniteness, any 
embodiments with silver sleeves that fall within the scope of Esab’s claims do so in 
virtue of the sleeves’ work functions rather than their silver composition.331 
Finally and most crucially, the Federal Circuit’s judgment of noninfringement 
illustrates that the warrants provided by scientific essentialism and scientific 
realism to the patent system’s ontological commitments are limited in scope by 
their epistemological reliance on the argument from the best explanation.332 The 
district court’s findings regarding the elemental composition of Centricut’s accused 
electrode333 did not warrant a de re ontological commitment to the electrode as an 
embodiment of the claim, because such a commitment could not be grounded in the 
best available scientific theories.334 In the absence of other record evidence 
regarding the scientific theories pertaining to work function, the Federal Circuit 
credited the testimony of the only expert in the case qualified on the subject.335 
Given the expert’s testimony to the effect that the unobserved336 work function of 
the accused electrode’s sleeve was neither an intrinsic property of the elemental 
silver observed in the sleeve’s composition337 nor an adequate explanation for the 
electrode’s observed durability,338 the argument from the best explanation could not 
justify a reasonable belief that the accused electrode was an example of the 
claim.339 
                                                          
 
329 See supra text accompanying note 152. 
330 See supra text accompanying notes 168–71. 
331 See supra text accompanying note 307. 
332 See supra text accompanying notes 186–89. 
333 See supra text accompanying note 308. 
334 See supra text accompanying note 181. 
335 See supra text accompanying notes 321–22. 
336 See supra text accompanying note 315. 
337 See supra text accompanying note 318. 
338 See supra text accompanying note 320. 
339 See supra text accompanying notes 321–22; cf. supra text accompanying notes 182–85 (explaining 
argument from the best explanation as the main justification for scientific essentialism’s ontological 
commitment to electrons as a natural kind). 
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The above examination of the Centricut case illustrates the critical role of 
enablement doctrine in warranting the patent system’s ontological commitments to 
claims as kinds whose examples are (possible) embodiments with essential causal 
powers. Given that claims are novel kinds, most of whose examples are 
unobservable entities,340 such warrants rely heavily on scientific realism and are 
justified in doing so by the argument from the best explanation. The warranting 
role of an enabling disclosure, then, is to furnish any theoretical or factual support 
that may be required in addition to the support provided by information known in 
the art, in order to satisfy the patent system that such reliance on the argument from 
the best explanation is justified. 
The enablement requirement is met if one of skill in the art “could make or 
use the invention from disclosures in the patent coupled with information known in 
the art without undue experimentation.”341 The ability of a reader of the patent 
disclosure to “make . . . the invention . . . without undue experimentation” logically 
implies the possible existence of embodiments as entities. What remains to be 
warranted by the ability to “use the invention . . . without undue experimentation” 
is the ontological status of the claim as a kind whose examples are embodiments 
with essential causal powers.342 This task is effectively performed by patent law’s 
operable utility doctrine,343 which requires that the claimed invention “be ‘capable 
of being used to effect the object proposed.’”344 
Under the operable utility doctrine, the patent system is normally inclined to 
admit a claim into its ontology of “useful Arts” on the basis of a filed patent 
application’s representation that embodiments of the claim can be used for the 
described purpose.345 Where there are “factual reasons which would lead one 
                                                          
 
340 See supra Part III.B.3. 
341 United States v. Telectronics, Inc., 857 F.2d 778, 785 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
342 See supra text accompanying notes 126–30; see generally Atlas Powder Co. v. E.I. du Pont De 
Nemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984). 
343 Enablement entails operable utility. See, e.g., Process Control Corp. v. HydReclaim Corp., 190 F.3d 
1350 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (“If a patent claim fails to meet the utility requirement because it is not useful or 
operative, then it also fails to meet the how-to-use aspect of the enablement requirement.”). 
344 Mitchell v. Tilghman, 86 U.S. 287, 396 (1873) (citation omitted) (“To meet the utility requirement, 
the Supreme Court has held that a new product or process must be shown to be ‘operable’—that is, it 
must be ‘capable of being used to effect the object proposed.’”). 
345 See In re Swartz, 232 F.3d 862, 864 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (citations omitted) (“The PTO has the initial 
burden of challenging a patent applicant’s presumptively correct assertion of utility.”); see also Ex parte 
Dash, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d 1481, 1484 (B.P.A.I. 1993), aff’d, 118 Fed. Appx. 488 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(unpublished opinion), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 346 (2005) (“A disclosure of a utility satisfies the utility 
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skilled in the art to question the objective truth of the statement of operability,”346 
however, the patent system cannot accept such a representation as an ontological 
warrant, and therefore requires proof of utility sufficient to convince one skilled in 
the art.347 Furthermore, patent law recognizes no scientific theories capable of 
supporting a belief in the existence and causal powers of a perpetual motion 
device,348 and the patent system in such a case can find warrant for a de dicto 
ontological commitment to this kind of device only in a direct observation of an 
embodiment that can also warrant de re ontological commitments to both the claim 
and the embodiment.349 
The patent system’s commitment to scientific realism350 thus manifests itself 
doctrinally as a rather liberal approach to epistemological justification, at least 
when it comes to de dicto commitment to a claim. Absent factual or theoretical 
inconsistencies with the argument from the best explanation, the patent system may 
                                                                                                                                      
 
requirement of section 101 unless there are reasons for the artisan to question the truth of such 
disclosure.”); In re Gazave, 379 F.2d 973 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (“[I]n the usual case where the mode of 
operation alleged can be readily understood and conforms to the known laws of physics and chemistry, 
operativeness is not questioned, and no further evidence is required.”). 
346 In re Gaubert, 524 F.2d at 1224–25. 
347 See supra text accompanying notes 193–95. 
348 See supra notes 196–201 and accompanying text; see also In re Gazave, 379 F.2d at 978 (“[I]f the 
alleged operation seems clearly to conflict with a recognized scientific principle as, for example, where 
an applicant purports to have discovered a machine producing perpetual motion, the presumption of 
inoperativeness is so strong that very clear evidence is required to overcome it.”). 
349 See supra text accompanying note 192. The distinction between de re and de dicto ontological 
commitments to embodiments may be material to patentability, e.g., where an examiner relies on the 
applicant’s experimental results. See Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc. v. Promega Corp., 323 F.3d 1354, 1367–
68 (Fed. Cir. 2003). 
To maintain this distinction, the patent system has adopted the linguistic practice of referring to a 
disclosed embodiment in the past tense only where de re ontological commitment is warranted. See id. 
at 1363–64 (“Example VI is written in the past tense . . . . From the language used, a reader of the patent 
would conclude that the protocol was performed and that the following results were actually 
achieved.”); MPEP, supra note 191, at § 608.01(p) (“No results should be represented as actual results 
unless they have actually been achieved. Paper examples should not be described using the past tense.”). 
To the extent that warrants for de re ontological commitment entail evidence of actual existence, 
the patent system may find that a disclosure provides a warrant for de dicto but not de re commitment. 
For example, prophetic examples can provide support for a claim if enabling. See Atlas Powder Co. v. 
E.I. du Pont DeNemours & Co., 750 F.2d 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (accepting trial court’s finding that 
prophetic examples “would be helpful in enabling someone to make the invention.”). 
350 See supra Part III.B.3. 
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find an acceptable warrant for such a commitment in the bare assertion that a kind 
of (possible) entity with certain essential causal powers exists in this (mind-
independent) world, and not merely the (mind-dependent) world of the inventor’s 
conception. 
V. TOWARD AN ESSENTIAL CAUSATION REQUIREMENT FOR 
PATENT-ELIGIBILITY 
This Article has presented a descriptive account of the ontology of “useful 
Arts” as revealed by the patent system’s legal doctrines and practices. In this 
ontology, claims are novel kinds of embodiments;351 and embodiments are entities 
whose properties include essential causal powers,352 and whose possible existence 
is therefore warranted by scientific essentialism and scientific realism.353 Many of 
the most fundamental and well-established doctrines of patent law commit the 
patent system to this ontology, including (1) the patentable subject matter 
requirement, which confines patentability to kinds of entities having causal 
powers;354 (2) doctrines pertaining to generic disclosure,355 inherent disclosure,356 
and operable utility,357 which presuppose that the possible embodiments of a claim 
possess certain (variable) causal powers in virtue of being examples of the kind 
defined by the claim; (3) the doctrines of constructive reduction to practice, 
anticipation and infringement, which entail commitments to claims and 
embodiments in this ontology;358 (4) the written description requirement, which 
serves in part to satisfy the patent system’s criteria for incurring such 
commitments;359 and (5) the enablement requirement, which serves in part to 
warrant such commitments.360 Several other well-known features of the patent 
system are also consistent with this ontological picture, including the infinite scope 
                                                          
 
351 See supra Part III.A. 
352 See supra Parts II.B.1–2. 
353 See supra Parts II.B.2–3. 
354 See supra text accompanying note 123. 
355 See supra text accompanying notes 129–30. 
356 See supra text accompanying notes 131–34. 
357 See supra text accompanying notes 190–92. 
358 See supra text accompanying notes 251–62. 
359 See supra text accompanying Part III.C. 
360 See supra text accompanying Part IV. 
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of patent claims,361 the prohibition on inferential claiming,362 the construction of 
preambular language in claims,363 and the near elimination of the Patent Office’s 
working model requirement.364 
If this theory correctly describes the patent system’s implicit ontology, then it 
also provides a precise criterion for distinguishing between a patent-ineligible 
abstract idea and a patent-eligible “practical method or means of producing a 
beneficial result or effect.”365 The latter characterization is applicable only where 
the utility of the claimed invention is amenable to explanation by a single causal 
account that reasonably specifies, inter alia, the resources necessarily brought into 
play by the invention’s use (even though such an account need not be known to or 
submitted by the patent applicant).366 Here I use “resources” broadly to refer to any 
quantities that have a well-defined causal role generally accepted by practitioners, 
including physical quantities such as mass, energy, charge, and momentum, and 
real-time computational resources such as CPU cycles, network bandwidth, 
memory, disk space, and battery life. Generally accepted explanatory principles 
governing the involvement of such resources in the essential causal powers of the 
claim’s embodiments may range from the conservation laws of physics to the 
scheduling disciplines implemented in operating systems.367 In future work, I plan 
to argue that this essential causation requirement, grounded in real-world resource 
considerations, can be readily satisfied by any practical method or means of 
achieving a useful effect, but not by any abstract idea.368 
The essential causation requirement holds considerable promise for stabilizing 
and clarifying patentable subject matter doctrine, as illustrated by the Federal 
Circuit’s analytical efforts in In re Nuijten.369 In Nuijten, a three-judge panel 
                                                          
 
361 See supra text accompanying note 127. 
362 See supra text accompanying note 74. 
363 See supra text accompanying notes 149–51. 
364 See supra text accompanying notes 190–92. 
365 See supra note 119 and accompanying text. 
366 See supra text accompanying note 198. 
367 Consistent with this requirement, embodiments of an invention may vary with respect to non-
essential causal powers. See supra text accompanying notes 124–25. 
368 See Chin, supra note 39. 
369 In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346 (Fed. Cir. 2007). 
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reviewed the Patent Office’s rejection of a claim for “a signal with embedded 
supplemental data”370 as directed to unpatentable subject matter.371 Construing the 
claim, Judge Arthur Gajarsa’s opinion, joined by Judge Kimberly Moore, found: 
The text of the claim[] is not limited by any specified physical medium . . . . [It] 
can of course be embodied by conventional, known means, such as electrical 
signals, modulated electromagnetic waves, and pulses in fiber optic cable. So 
long as some object or transmission carries the information specified by 
Nuijten’s claim, it falls within that claim’s scope regardless of its physical 
form.372 
Judge Richard Linn concurred with this finding,373 and further noted that the claim 
could cover a signal derived from “a pulse of energy or a stone tablet.”374 The court 
divided, however, on the legal question of whether “[a] transient electric or 
electromagnetic transmission” is a “manufacture” within the meaning of § 101 of 
the Patent Act.375 The majority focused on the transmission’s transience and 
intangibility as disqualifying characteristics.376 The dissent, however, noted the 
materiality of the transmission’s physical carrier, which is given form and therefore 
manufactured by human action or a machine,377 and called for a broad 
interpretation of the statutory categories to include “anything under the sun that is 
made by man.”378 
                                                          
 
370 Id. at 1351. Claim 14 of Petrus Nuijten’s application read in full: “A signal with embedded 
supplemental data, the signal being encoded in accordance with a given encoding process and selected 
samples of the signal representing the supplemental data, and at least one of the samples preceding the 
selected samples is different from the sample corresponding to the given encoding process.” Id. 
371 See id. at 1351–52. 
372 Id. at 1353. 
373 See id. at 1358 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
374 Id. 
375 Id. at 1356–57; id at 1359 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
376 See id. at 1356–57. 
377 Id. at 1358 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
378 See id. at 1362–63 (quoting Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980)). 
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While Nuijten is still good law,379 Judge Gajarsa’s reasoning has been subject 
to well-founded criticism. To the extent that the majority’s legal conclusion is 
based on the claimed signal’s transience, it is incompatible with a 1980 Court of 
Customs and Patent Appeals decision that held “transitory, unstable, and non-
isolatable” chemical intermediates to be patentable.380 To the extent that the 
conclusion relies on the reasoning that “[a] transient electric or electromagnetic 
transmission”381 is intangible, it denies the prevailing scientific view that electrons 
and photons are particles that exert pressure on objects.382 The majority’s stated 
holding, that physical but transitory electric or electromagnetic forms of signal 
transmission are not patent-eligible subject matter,383 is therefore controversial at 
best.384 
By recognizing the patent system’s metaphysical commitment to the essential 
causation requirement, the Nuijten court could have invalidated the claim on less 
contested grounds. The objectionable aspect of Nuijten’s claim to “a signal” was 
not the transitory or intangible nature of the signal, but the disparate causal powers 
that the various embodiments of the claimed invention purported to employ. All 
three of the judges construed Nuijten’s claim so broadly as to encompass every 
physical medium capable of carrying data. Presumably, all would also agree that a 
pulse of electromagnetic energy and a stone tablet employ different causal powers, 
and bring very different kinds of resources into play, in conveying information. 
                                                          
 
379 In particular, Nuijten’s holding survives Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218 (2010), which addressed 
the scope of the judicially created abstract-idea exclusion from patentable subject matter for process 
claims. 130 S. Ct. at 3229–31. The claim at issue in Nuijten was not a process claim. See 500 F.3d at 
1354–55. Also, since the Nuijten holding is based solely on a determination that the claim does not fall 
within any of the statutory categories of patentable subject matter, see id. at 1353–54, the majority’s 
analysis does not reach any of the judicially created exceptions. 
380 See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1359 (Linn, J., dissenting) (citing In re Breslow, 616 F.2d 516, 519, 521–22 
(C.C.P.A. 1980)); In re Nuijten, 515 F.3d 1361, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Linn, J., dissenting from denial 
of petition for rehearing en banc) (same). 
381 See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1356–57. 
382 See Dolly Y. Wu & Steven M. Geiszler, Patentable Subject Matter: What Is the Matter with Matter?, 
15 VA. J.L. & TECH. 101, 128–32 (2010). 
383 See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1353. 
384 See Mark A. Lemley et al., Life After Bilski, 63 STAN. L. REV. 1315, 1328 n.68 (2011) (citation 
omitted) (describing the Nuijten holding as “questionable as a matter of physics and statutory 
interpretation”); see also Scott Bloebaum, Comment, From Telegraphs to Content Protection: The 
Evolution of Signals as Patentable Subject Matter Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, 9 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 243, 
265–75 (2008) (criticizing Nuijten). 
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Nuijten’s claim would therefore present an easy case for the essential causation 
test. It does not limit its embodiments to any essential causal power, and is 
therefore simply too abstract to be compatible with the ontological commitments 
and warrants that make up the patent system’s ontology of “useful Arts.” 
Judge Linn proceeded in his dissent to opine that “the outer limits of statutory 
subject matter should not depend on metaphysical distinctions such as those 
between hardware and software or matter and energy.”385 The hardware/software 
and matter/energy distinctions indeed rest on unstable theoretical foundations,386 
but the essential causation requirement does not necessitate such potentially fine 
line-drawing, and Judge Linn would have had no difficulty in applying the 
requirement to Nuijten’s claim. Of course, Judge Linn’s comment also gives voice 
to the patent system’s apparent discomfort with metaphysical distinctions as a 
source of legal rules.387 But as this Article has demonstrated and the Supreme Court 
acknowledged more than 160 years ago,388 the patent system’s involvement with 
metaphysics is ubiquitous and profound. If the patent system is to take its existing 
metaphysical commitments seriously, the kind of “signal” described by Nuijten’s 
abstract claim language cannot be admitted into the patent system’s ontology. 
Judge Randall Rader’s dissenting opinion in In re Bilski389 described the 
problems such an ontological mismatch could cause for the patent system in 
examining an abstract claim: 
When considering the eligibility of “processes,” this court should focus on the 
potential for an abstract claim. Such an abstract claim would appear in a form 
that is not even susceptible to examination against prior art under the traditional 
                                                          
 
385 See Nuijten, 500 F.3d at 1367 (Linn, J., dissenting). 
386 See Albert Einstein, Ist die Trägheit eines Körpers von seinem Energieinhalt abhängig?, 18 
ANNALEN DER PHYSIK 639 (1905) (proposing mass-energy equivalence); Alan Turing, On Computable 
Numbers, with an Application to the Entscheidungsproblem, 42 PROC. LONDON MATH. SOC’Y (SERIES 
2) 230 (1937) (describing the Turing machine model of computation, which can be implemented either 
as hardware or software). 
387 See supra notes 19–23 and accompanying text. 
388 See Hogg v. Emerson, 47 U.S. 437, 485–86 (1848). 
389 In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 945, 1011–15 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (Rader, J., dissenting). 
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tests for patentability. Thus this court would wish to ensure that the claim 
supplied some concrete, tangible technology for examination.390 
Judge Rader’s dissent, the only Federal Circuit opinion cited with approval by the 
Supreme Court majority in Bilski v. Kappos,391 describes an essentially 
metaphysical approach to the abstract-ideas exclusion. Judge Rader would hold that 
abstract claims are “not even susceptible to examination against prior art” because 
to perform such an examination would entail the category error392 of treating an 
abstract idea as if it were “concrete, tangible technology.” The ontological 
mismatch between an abstract claim and the “useful Arts”393 would reveal itself in 
the patent system’s practice of examining the claim against prior art.394 
The descriptive ontological account in this Article, therefore, may have 
considerable prescriptive relevance as the Federal Circuit takes up the Bilski 
Court’s invitation to “develop[] other limiting criteria that further the purposes of 
the Patent Act and are not inconsistent with its text.”395 As this Article has 
demonstrated, among the purposes of the Patent Act is the regulation of the patent 
document’s role in informing the patent system’s ontological commitments. The 
essential causation requirement furthers that purpose, coheres with the patent 
system’s statutes, doctrines and practices, and draws meaningful patent-eligibility 
distinctions without “pos[ing] questions of such intricacy and refinement that they 
risk obscuring” the patent system’s larger goals.396 In a forthcoming article,397 I 
                                                          
 
390 Id. at 1013. 
391 See Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. 3218, 3227, 3231 (2010). 
392 See THE CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY OF PHILOSOPHY, supra note 47 (defining category mistake). 
393 See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 315 (1980) (explaining that the Patent Act’s subject 
matter provisions “have been cast in broad terms to fulfill the constitutional and statutory goal of 
promoting ‘the Progress of Science and the useful Arts . . . .’”); In re Comiskey, 554 F.3d 967, 977 
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (explaining that in enacting statutory limitations on patentable subject matter, 
“Congress [] responded to the bidding of the Constitution” to promote the progress of “useful Arts” 
(quoting Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 6 (1966))). 
394 Cf. David S. Oderberg, Hylemorphic Dualism, 22 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 70, 89 (2005) (“[T]here is an 
essential ontological mismatch between the proper objects of intellectual activity . . . and any kind of 
potential physical embodiment of them. . . . Concepts, propositions, and arguments are abstract; 
potential material loci for these items are concrete.”). 
395 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S .Ct. at 3231. 
396 Id. at 3227 (citing In re Bilski, 545 F.3d at 1015 (Rader, J., dissenting)). 
397 See Chin, supra note 39. 
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will demonstrate the application of the essential causation requirement to several 
legally significant information technology patents. My tentative conclusion is that 
the “machine-or-transformation” inquiry, though downgraded by the Bilski Court 
from a “test” to a “useful and important clue,”398 can appropriately be adopted as a 
strict requirement for the patent-eligibility of software-implemented inventions.399 
VI. CONCLUSION 
This Article has not come close to conducting an exhaustive inventory of the 
patent system’s metaphysical commitments. In another future article, I plan to 
explore the patent system’s orientation to mental causation and the so-called mind-
body problem, which are perhaps the most enduring controversies in all of 
metaphysics.400 The standard causal account of how the patent system “promote[s] 
the Progress of . . . useful Arts” seems unproblematically to traverse the boundary 
between mental and physical properties without engaging in any of these 
metaphysical debates: (1) the patent system hastens inventions and disclosures by 
offering patents as economic incentives401 to (2) inventors who conceive,402 reduce 
                                                          
 
398 Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct. at 3227. 
399 To justify this conclusion, I will have to address doubts raised by the Bilski majority and numerous 
amici concerning the applicability and practicability of the “machine-or-transformation” inquiry in the 
“Information Age.” See id. at 3227 (citing amicus briefs from the Business Software Alliance, 
Biotechnology Industry Organization et al., the Boston Patent Law Association, the Houston Intellectual 
Property Law Association, and Dolby Labs., Inc.). 
400 For a description of the philosophical controversies surrounding the mind-body problem, see, for 
example, THE OXFORD COMPANION TO PHILOSOPHY 608 (Ted Honderich ed., 2d ed. 2005) (describing 
the modern “mind-body debate” as focused on “the status of mental states, processes, and properties vis-
à-vis physical states, processes, and properties.”). The problem dates back to René Descartes in 1641. 
See generally RENÉ DESCARTES, DISCOURSE ON METHOD AND MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 
(Donald A. Cress trans., 3d ed. 1993). 
401 See, e.g., Arnold Plant, The Economic Theory Concerning Patents for Inventions, 1 ECONOMICA 30, 
32 (1934) (“[T]he purpose of patents for inventions is, by giving an inventor the control for a definite 
period over the disposal of his invention, to make it easier for him to derive an income from it. . . . [T]he 
ultimate aim is to encourage inventing.”). 
402 Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (defining 
conception as the “formation in the mind of the inventor, of a definite and permanent idea of the 
complete and operative invention . . . .”) (quoting 1 ROBINSON ON PATENTS 532 (1890)). 
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to practice,403 and disclose their (3) inventions, which others can learn (at will) and 
use (as authorized by the patentee) to produce beneficial effects.404 
It might be suggested that to foreground the implicit mind-body metaphysics 
within this account is to risk taking sides in a dispute the patent system lacks the 
time and expertise to adjudicate rigorously. For example, the doctrine conferring 
inventorship on one who conceives of an invention but relies on another to reduce 
it to practice405 may appear to commit the patent system to mind-body dualism406 
(the view that the mind is not part of the physical world407), a stance that is under 
heavy siege from contemporary neuroscience408 and has long fallen out of fashion 
among analytic philosophers.409 More fundamentally, the interactions of minds, 
                                                          
 
403 Reduction to practice, whether constructive (filing a patent application) or actual (producing an 
embodiment of the invention in “physical or tangible form”), entails a physical act. See Wetmore v. 
Quick, 536 F.2d 937, 941 (C.C.P.A. 1976)). 
404 See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 183 n.7 (1981) (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S. 252, 
268 (1853)) (“‘It is for the discovery or invention of some practical method or means of producing a 
beneficial result or effect, that a patent is granted’. . . .”). 
405 See Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 40 F.3d 1223, 1227–29 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (stating 
that to be recognized as a joint inventor, each collaborator “must contribute to the joint arrival at a 
definite and permanent idea of the invention as it will be used in practice”; i.e., the conception of the 
invention). Constructive reduction to practice is typically completed by patent attorneys and agents, who 
do not thereby become co-inventors. See generally Solomon v. Kimberly-Clark Corp., 216 F.3d 1372, 
1382 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (rejecting the argument that patent attorney had become a joint inventor in the 
course of “defining [the client’s] invention to obtain, if possible, a valid patent with maximum 
coverage”). 
The determination of priority of inventorship is a distinct issue, and is not based solely on first 
conception. See 35 U.S.C. § 102(g)(2) (providing that priority determination shall consider conception, 
reduction to practice, and diligence); see also Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 1993) 
(“Although derivation and priority of invention are akin in that both focus on inventorship . . . they are 
distinct concepts.”). 
406 See Burk, supra note 16, at 1986 (arguing that the conception-focused inventorship doctrine 
exemplifies a “striking pattern of dualism” in the patent system). 
407 ANTHONY DARDIS, MENTAL CAUSATION 17 (2008). 
408 See, e.g., W.W. Meissner, The Mind-Brain Relation and Neuroscientific Foundations: I. The 
Problem and Neuroscientific Approaches, 70 BULL. MENNINGER CLINIC 87, 89 (2006) (“For all 
practical purposes, modern neuroscientists are virtually unanimous in rejecting frank dualism.”). 
409 See Howard Robinson, Dualism, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Nov. 3, 2011), http:// 
plato.stanford.edu/entries/dualism/ (describing dualism as “out of fashion” in philosophy since the 
publication of Gilbert Ryle’s monograph The Concept of Mind in 1949); but see, e.g., DAVID J. 
CHALMERS, THE CONSCIOUS MIND: IN SEARCH OF A FUNDAMENTAL THEORY (1996) (offering a modern 
analytical defense of dualism, at least as to the non-physicality of mental properties). 
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bodies and money in innovative processes are too complex and varied to be 
metaphysically subsumed under a single causal account of how the patent laws 
hasten innovation.410 
Closer study of these metaphysical accounts of causation could also 
illuminate the law-of-nature exclusion from patentable subject matter. A potential 
doctrinal difficulty arises from the fact that our knowledge of the physical laws that 
govern causality in the world is contingent and incomplete. For example, the 
Supreme Court in Parker v. Flook411 cites Newton’s law of universal gravitation as 
an unpatentable “scientific principle” that “reveals a relationship that has always 
existed.”412 But the relationship F = Gmm' / r2 “exists” between two bodies, if at 
all, only where there are no forces other than gravitational forces at work.413 
Moreover, its status as a “fundamental truth” is subject to falsification by future 
contrary observations,414 which will remain possible as long as physics is unable to 
provide a complete account of all phenomena.415 If the Court’s language in Le Roy 
and Flook is read as a permanent ontological commitment to Newton’s law (and 
other laws of today’s physics) as true descriptions of the natural world, then those 
precedents are untenable as a basis for a metaphysical characterization of the “laws 
of nature” exception.416 
My current view is that both of the above difficulties are the avoidable result 
of reading problematic metaphysical commitments into patent doctrine where none 
need be found. The inventorship doctrine’s account of mental causation does not 
entail mind-body dualism. The structure and function of the patent incentive are 
                                                          
 
410 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 
1595–1630 (2003) (surveying “widely disparate explanations for the role of patents” in promoting 
innovation in general and in specific industries). 
411 Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
412 Id. at 593 n.15 (citing PETER D. ROSENBERG, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 4, at 13 (1975)). 
413 NANCY CARTWRIGHT, HOW THE LAWS OF PHYSICS LIE 57–58 (1983). 
414 See generally KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 78–92 (1959) (introducing 
falsifiability as a scientific criterion). 
415 Cf. Alyssa Ney, Physicalism as an Attitude, 138 PHIL. STUD. 1, 2 (2008) (“If physicalism is taken to 
be the view that the world is the way current physics says it is, then it is false since current physics is 
incomplete and at this time is probably not in a position to give us a complete explanation of all that 
exists.”). 
416 See Simon, supra note 16, at 2191 (“That laws of nature are Truths to be uncovered and mastered by 
reason is a notion that continues to hold deep intuitive sway. There is no way to disprove this conjecture. 
But that is a far cry from saying that it is a reasonable cornerstone of modern patent law.”). 
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essentially teleological, not causal. Patent-eligibility determinations can be 
grounded in today’s best scientific theories without committing the patent system 
to accept their truth should they eventually be falsified. While I claim no special 
knowledge regarding the future,417 I trust that this Article has demonstrated the 
potential value of further inquiries into the patent system’s metaphysical 
commitments, regardless of their ultimate outcomes. 
                                                          
 
417 Cf. text accompanying note 6. 
